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SOMMARIO 
Il presente dottorato si propone di sviluppare il tema della valutazione dell’errore commesso dai 
codici per l'analisi termoidraulica di transitori operazionali e/o incidentali in un impianto 
nucleare di potenza. La disponibilità di uno strumento, che permetta di valutare attraverso quali 
scenari un ipotetico incidente in un reattore nucleare possa evolvere, ovvero consenta 
l'ottimizzazione dei parametri di funzionamento nominale dello stesso impianto (si pensi ad 
esempio al valore della potenza lineare e alla sua influenza sulla temperatura di barretta in caso 
di LOCA), rappresenta attualmente uno dei principali obiettivi della ricerca nel campo della 
sicurezza nucleare. Negli ultimi anni sono stati messi a punto numerosi codici di sistema per 
simulare il comportamento in situazioni rilevanti per la sicurezza e/o l’operabilità di impianto 
tipo PWR e/o BWR e tra questi, quelli delle famiglie RELAP (US) e CATHARE (F). 
 
Un grande sforzo è stato contemporaneamente profuso da parte della comunità scientifica nella 
valutazione/quantificazione dell’incertezza associata e/o associabile alla predizione del 
comportamento di un impianto durante un transitorio da parte di tali codici, che ha portato allo 
sviluppo di metodi di stima in via di riconoscimento da parte degli enti regolatori, un esempio 
per tutti è rappresentato dalla metodologia CSAU (Code Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty) 
sviluppata negli USA come parte integrante di analisi di "Best Estimate" al fine di sostituire 
l'utilizzo di modelli conservativi ("Evaluation Model") nel "licensing" dei nuovi impianti, nei 
casi di LBLOCA e SBLOCA. Dal punto di vista della trattazione scientifica del problema, si 
ricorda che in ambito OECD/CSNI (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development/Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installation) è stato dedicato al tema uno 
specifico gruppo di lavoro, l'UMS (Uncertainty Method Study), nel cui ambito era previsto il 
confronto dei risultati d’incertezza ottenuti dalle diverse metodologie fino ad oggi sviluppate. 
Allo stesso problema, sempre dall'OECD/CSNI sono stati dedicati i congressi di Annapolis 
(1996) e Ankara (1998) dai quali sono emerse, tra le altre cose, le necessità future relativamente 
allo sviluppo, qualifica e capacità per l’uso di codici e di metodologie di incertezza nel processo 
di “licensing”. 
 
L’Università di Pisa partecipa da anni al dibattito scientifico in materia, promuovendo diversi 
Temi di Laurea e di Dottorato e sviluppando nel tempo una propria autonoma via di approccio al 
problema che ha portato alla messa a punto della metodologia UMAE (Uncertainty Methodology 
based on the Accuracy Extrapolation) e successivamente della procedura CIAU (Code with – the 
capability of Internal Assessment of Uncertainty). 
 
Tra questi, il presente programma di dottorato si pone come obiettivo generale 
l’approfondimento delle problematiche concernenti la valutazione dell’incertezza nei codici per 
analisi di "Best Estimate", contribuendo allo sviluppo e incrementando le capacità della 
procedura CIAU, e rendendo la stessa applicabile alle predizioni effettuate con il codice del 
CATHARE2 sviluppato in Francia presso il CEA (Commissariat à le Energie Atomique). In 
particolare i seguenti obiettivi specifici erano stati previsti in sede di presentazione del 
programma di ricerca (Marzo 2004): 
 
• approfondimento delle problematiche concernenti la valutazione dell’incertezza nei codici 
Best Estimate; 
• implementazione alla procedura CIAU della capacità di poter essere applicata al codice 
francese CATHARE2; 
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• convalida e confronto dei risultati a fronte di quelli derivanti dall'utilizzo del database 
costruito per il codice RELAP5. 
 
La tesi di dottorato, in oggetto, rappresenta la sintesi e finalizzazione dell’attività svolta, al fine 
di documentare il raggiungimento degli obiettivi prefissati. In particolare, la descrizione 
dell’attività e dei risultati ottenuti è stata divisa in sette capitoli, di cui uno introduttivo (il primo) 
e uno conclusivo (l’ultimo). 
 
Nell’introduzione, dopo aver descritto i vari tipi di approccio per effettuare le analisi di 
sicurezza, tre sezioni sono dedicate alla rilevanza che le analisi “Best Estimate” hanno per 
l’ottimizzazione del “design” dei nuovi impianti e del funzionamento dei vecchi a fronte dei 
vincoli imposti nel processo di “licensing”. Un chiaro e costante riferimento è posto alle 
normative di enti quali IAEA e NRC. Tali sezioni rappresentano un prologo per il Capitolo 1 
dedicato agli obbiettivi della presente tesi di dottorato e ad una dettagliata descrizione di come 
tali obbiettivi sono stati raggiunti e nell’ambito di quali progetti. 
 
Il secondo capitolo è dedicato ad una descrizione dei vari metodi di incertezza applicabili ai 
codici termoidraulici “Best Estimate”. In particolare, da prima si fornisce una classificazione di 
principio per poi passare in rassegna le principali metodologie attualmente applicate all’analisi di 
sicurezza. L’ultima sezione è dedicata alla introduzione delle metodologie ideate e sviluppate al 
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Meccanica Nucleare e della Produzione dell’Università di Pisa: 
“Uncertainty Method based on Accuracy Extrapolation” (UMAE) e “Code with capability of 
Internal Assessment of Uncertainty (CIAU). 
 
La procedura CIAU è estensivamente descritta nel Capitolo 3, fornendo adeguate nozioni delle 
definizioni e dei principi su cui si basa. Lo stato di sviluppo di tale procedura, aggiornato al 
momento in cui questa tesi è stata scritta, è stato brevemente esposto così come è fatta menzione 
delle principali applicazioni effettuate con il codice RELAP5. Infine ampio spazio è dedicato ai 
programmi su cui si basa lo sviluppo e l’applicazione della procedura CIAU: AFE, DAST e 
UBEP. 
 
Il Capitolo 4 è diviso in due parti: una prima parte è dedicata ad un’introduzione del codice di 
riferimento dell’attività, il CATHARE2 (F); la seconda alla realizzazione del database di 
accuratezze e incertezze ottenute attraverso analisi effettuate su apparecchiature sperimentali. 
Tale capitolo rappresenta, di fatto, la sintesi di un’attività che ha richiesto un dispendio di risorse 
sia di tempo, che di professionalità, così come, di potenza di calcolo. Gli appendici A e B sono 
complementare a questo capitolo. 
 
L’ultimo capitolo (il Capitolo 5), prima delle conclusioni (Capitolo 6), è dedicato alla qualifica e 
all’applicazione della procedura CIAU attraverso l’utilizzazione del database sviluppato e 
descritto nel Capitolo 4. Per la qualifica è stato seguito lo stesso approccio già sperimentato per il 
database RELAP5. Tale processo si basa su due “step”: il primo di verifica dei dati appartenenti 
al database, per assicurarsi che i principi su cui si basa la procedura CIAU non siano violati; il 
secondo, la qualifica esterna, è basato sul transitorio LSTF SB-CL-18, analizzato nell’ambito 
UMS. Infine una pionieristica applicazione ad un problema di interesse industriale è stata 
effettuata a scopo puramente dimostrativo dello stato di sviluppo della metodologia. L’impianto 
Kozloduy-3 (VVER440) è stato preso a riferimento e la valutazione di incertezza è stata 
effettuata sullo stesso transitorio gia analizzato presso il DIMNP con il codice RELAP5 e 
CATHARE2. 
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ABSTRACT 
The present activity addresses the uncertainty evaluation issues with reference to the error that 
the TH-SYS codes commit in predicting the operational and/or the accident transients during the 
deterministic safety analyses of the NPP. The availability of tools that are able to predict how a 
postulated accident will evolve and, for this reason, that allow the optimization of the parameters 
relevant for the NPP behavior (i.e. the fuel linear power that is connected with the maximum 
cladding temperature in case of a LOCA) is, at present, one of the main objectives of the 
research in the filed of the nuclear safety. Several TH-SYS codes were developed and 
continuously assessed during the last 30 year. The aim of such codes (i.e. CATHARE2, 
ATHLET, RELAP5, TRACE...) is to correctly simulate and predict NPP (BWR and PWR) 
relevant transients from the safety point of view. 
 
A large effort, by scientific community, has been spent also for the evaluation/quantification of 
the uncertainty connected with the application of such codes in predicting the behavior of a NPP. 
Different uncertainty methods were developed and their evaluation is now in progress by the 
regulatory authorities. An example is the CSAU methodology (Code Scaling, Applicability, and 
Uncertainty) developed in USA with the objective to apply the Best Estimate instead of the 
conservative evaluation models in the framework of “licensing” analyses of the SBLOCA and 
LBLOCA. Other relevant milestones related to this issue are the UMS (Uncertainty Method 
Study) were different uncertainty methods were applied and compared, and also the international 
congresses of Annapolis (1996) and Ankara (1998). In these frameworks, the necessity to 
perform Best Estimate analysis Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) evaluation of the results, instead of the 
conservative ones, was highlighted as well as the characteristics, the requirements and the level 
of qualification that such methods should have in order to be applied to nuclear technology. 
 
University of Pisa is participating from several years to the scientific discussions. Moreover 
several MS and Ph.D. theses were devoted to such issue and allowed the development of owner 
methodologies: the UMAE (Uncertainty Methodology based on the Accuracy Extrapolation) and 
after the CIAU (Code with – the capability of Internal Assessment of Uncertainty). 
 
Between them, the present Ph.D. thesis aims at the general objective to address the uncertainty 
evaluation issues with respect to the BE TH-SYS application, contributing to the development 
and increasing of the CIAU procedure capability and allowing the application of such method to 
the analyses performed with the CATHARE2 code. The following objectives were discussed and 
approved in the framework of the presentation of the research program plan (March 2004): 
 
• review of the state of the art in the frame of the uncertainty evaluation; 
• improvement, extension and the strengtheness of the CIAU procedure capability, allowing 
the application to CATHARE2 code; 
• validation of the CIAU procedure developed for CATHARE2 code with reference to the 
activity already done for RELAP5.  
 
The present manuscript represents the synthesis and the finalization of the activity performed, in 
order to document the achievements of the planned objectives. Going into details, the description 
of the activity and results has been divided in seven chapters. Between them, one is the Foreword 
(the first) and another is the Conclusions (the last). 
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The Foreword deals with a summary of the different approaches for performing safety analyses. 
Three sections are devoted to the relevance of the Best Estimate analyses in optimizing the new 
designs and the behavior of the actual NPPs with respect to the limits of the licensing process. 
Reference is constantly the documents issued by IAEA and NRC. These sections are the 
introduce the Chapter 1 devoted to the objective of the present Ph. D. thesis and to a detailed 
description of the activities performed in order to fulfill such objectives. 
 
The second chapter provides an overview of the main methods applicable to the uncertainty 
evaluation in the BE TH-SYS code analyses. The last section is devoted to an introduction and 
an overview of the research activities performed at University of Pisa. In this framework an 
overview of the first uncertainty method developed the Uncertainty Method based on Accuracy 
Extrapolation” (UMAE) is also given. 
 
A complete description of the “Code with capability of Internal Assessment of Uncertainty 
(CIAU) is reported in Chapter 3. The description deals with the main definitions, the hypotheses, 
the “status” of development, up to date to the time when the present Thesis is written. Moreover, 
the key applications carried out with RELAP5 code are also mentioned. The last part provides a 
detailed overview AFE, DAST e UBEP. These are the programs necessary for developing and 
applying the CIAU procedure.  
 
Chapter 4 is divided into two parts: the first is devoted to an introduction of CATHARE2 (F), the 
reference code of the activity; the second is focused on the description of the accuracies and 
uncertainties database obtained with the post test analyses of experiments executed in the ITFs. 
This Chapter is the synthesis of the activity that required a large amount of resources of 
professional skill as well as of computational tools. The Appendix A and B are complementary 
to this chapter. 
 
The last chapter, before the Conclusions (Chapter 6), is devoted to the qualification of CIAU 
procedure developed using the database developed and described in Chapter 4. The qualification 
process is based on the same approach already performed for the development phase of the 
RELAP5 database. This is a “two steps” process: the first (internal qualification) is a verification 
that the data embedded in the database are not in contradiction with the CIAU procedure 
hypotheses; the second (the external qualification) is based on the LSTF SB-CL-18 transient, 
experiment used in the framework of the UMS. Finally a pioneering application of a typical 
industrial problem has been performed, for demonstrating the development status of the CIAU 
procedure developed for CATHARE2. The analysis is related to Kozloduy-3 (VVER440) NPP 
and the uncertainty analysis is performed using the results of an LBLOCA transient already 
analyzed at UNIPI by RELAP5 e CATHARE2. 
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SL Steam Line 
SOT Start of Test 
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SRV Steam Relief Valve 
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TBP To Be Produced 
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TM Test Matrix 
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U Unqualified 
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UT U-tubes 
VCS Volume Control System 
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WF Weighted Frequency 
WWER Water moderated Water cooled Energy Reactor (other acronym of VVER) 
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FOREWORD 
The current efforts to assure stable, safe and competitive operation of Nuclear Power Plants 
(NPP) go together with advances made in the accident analysis domain, where deterministic 
safety analyses are an important instrument for confirming the adequacy and efficiency of 
provisions for the safety of nuclear power plants. 
 
The main objective of safety analysis is to demonstrate that all safety requirements are met, i.e. 
that sufficient margins exist between real values of important parameters and their threshold 
values at which damage of the barriers against release of radioactivity would occur. 
 
“…A safety analysis of the plant design shall be conducted in which methods of both 
deterministic and probabilistic analysis shall be applied…The computer programs, analytical 
methods and plant models used in the safety analysis shall be verified and validated, and 
adequate consideration shall be given to uncertainties…”/1/. 
 
Various options exist for combining computer codes types and input data for safety analysis. In 
Ref /2/ four options, summarized in Tab. 1, are identified. 
 
• Option 1 approach is the very conservative or Appendix K (of 10 CFR 50.46, USA) 
analysis in the case of LOCA. Many regulatory bodies prescribe the conservative 
models/correlations to be used for safety analysis. In the case of Appendix K code models 
are prescribed, for example, Baker-Just correlation for clad oxidation, etc… 
• The option 2 is similar to the option 1 approach except for the fact that best estimate 
computer codes are used instead of conservative codes. However, it must be noted that in 
certain countries option 2 is considered a conservative analysis.  
• The option 3 approach assumes that the initial and boundary conditions are taken as 
realistic with consideration of their uncertainties. From the point of view of the computer 
codes used and assumptions regarding availability of systems, the approach is the same as 
option 2. In several countries, such as the USA, option 3 is best estimate analysis with 
uncertainty evaluation or Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU). A summary of the 
main methods used for the uncertainty evaluation is given in section 2.2 while a detailed 
description of the UNIPI methods is provided in section 2.3, including a detailed 
description of the CIAU software (section 3). In real practice, the mixture of option 2 and 
option 3 is employed. By the way all options mentioned make conservative assumptions 
regarding the availability of the systems. 
• The option 4 is the most rigorous approach. It consists in a realistic analysis for quantifying 
the availability of systems, significant from safety point of view. The availability is 
usually quantified based on PSA based assumptions. This option would also contribute 
towards risk informed regulation. 
 
Option Computer code Availability of systems Initial and boundary conditions 
1 Conservative Conservative assumptions Conservative input data 
2 Best estimate Conservative assumptions Conservative input data 
3 Best estimate Conservative assumptions Realistic input data with uncertainties# 
4 Best estimate PSA based assumptions* Realistic input data with uncertainties # 
# The realistic input data is used only if the uncertainties or their probabilistic distributions are known. For those parameters 
whose uncertainties are not quantifiable with high confidence, their conservative values are be used. 
* In lieu of PSA based assumptions the reliability based calculations may also be employed for quantifying the availability of 
systems. 
Tab. 1 - Various options for combination of a computer code and input data. 
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Recent advances in development of best estimate code and introduction of new uncertainty 
evaluation methods are gradually replacing the conventional conservative evaluation methods. 
Uncertainties are present in calculations due to the computer codes and due to input data for the 
code. Thermal-hydraulic system code calculations are affected by unavoidable errors arising 
from several causes, including the unavoidable approximations in the constitutive equations, 
from the limited capabilities of numerical solution methods, from uncertainties in the knowledge 
of boundary and initial conditions, from errors in setting up the nodalization, etc... The 
characterization and/or the origin of the approximations are discussed in Ref. /3/. These can be 
characterized by hundreds of parameters that are typically part of the input deck for a system 
code calculation suitable for predicting a transient scenario in a NPP. This happens 
notwithstanding the high code performance level and the systematic qualification processes, 
nowadays in progress or completed. It is necessary to remind, in this connection, that the user 
choices strongly affect the code results, through the so called "user effect" (see Ref. /4/).  
 
All conservative approaches, still widely used, were introduced to cover uncertainties due to 
limited capability for modeling and understanding of physical phenomena at the early stages of 
safety analysis. Consequences of such analyses are results quite unrealistic and the level of 
conservatism is not fully known. 
 
On the other hands, the BE codes, as already mentioned, are applied to the safety: 
 
• in combination with a reasonably conservative selection of input data and a sufficient 
evaluation of the uncertainties of the results; 
• with realistic initial and boundary conditions. 
 
Both options are considered acceptable and suggested by the existing IAEA Safety Standards /1/ 
/5/
. The option 2 is still more typically used at present for safety analysis in many countries. The 
international activity aims at the code validations as well as various evaluations of data 
uncertainties, and sensitivity studies helps to establish confidence in calculated results. 
 
By the way, international efforts are lavished for developing and qualifying reliable tools that 
will allow the full use of BE analysis. This approach, based on the BE analyses and the 
uncertainty evaluation of the results, offers in addition a way to quantify the existing plant safety 
margins. Notwithstanding the application of this approach is envisaged in the next future until 
now this is not always feasible: the main issue is related to the capability of quantifying code 
uncertainties with sufficiently narrow range for every phenomenon and for each accident 
sequence. 
Requirements of BE computational tools 
The use of BE computational tools is regulated by national regulatory bodies that must accept the 
codes and their applications modalities. The applicability of such codes to the accident analysis 
requires that those codes and their use fulfill prerequisites that are: QA, Verification and 
Validation (V&V), user qualification, nodalization qualification. For an extensive description see 
Ref. /6/. 
 
A comprehensive QA program needs to be applied to all activities affecting the quality of the 
final results. More specifically, formalized QA procedures and instructions should be developed 
for the whole accident analysis process including code development, acquisition of the plant 
data, developed computational tool (computer input deck) and documentation of detected errors. 
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V&V are specific concepts and required steps in the computational tools qualification process. A 
BE code must overcome a process of verification and validation during the development phase 
and an assessment process to be considered as fully available to the user for analyses. Code 
verification is defined as a comparison of the source coding with its description in the 
documentation. Code validation is normally a regulatory requirement that codes be assessed 
(validated) in relation to relevant experimental data for the major phenomena expected to occur. 
The validation relates to the confidence that can be placed on the accuracy of the values 
predicted by the code. The specifics of what is required will vary according to the particulars of 
the safety assessment under consideration. Four sources of data are generally used to validate 
these codes: phenomenological data, data on separate effects (component data), integral data and 
plant operational data. For validation, certain quantities are selected for the comparison of 
calculations with experimental data. A code can sometimes predict a set of data with a high 
degree of accuracy and still be extremely inaccurate for other data sets. This has led to the need 
to develop a “validation matrix” /7//8//9/ for each code through which different types of 
experimental facilities and different sets of conditions in the same facility are used for code 
validation. Most internationally recognized codes (i.e. REALP5, CATHARE2, ATHLET, TRCE, 
etc…) have been subjected to systematic validation procedures through a number of international 
programs, with system thermal hydraulic codes receiving the most attention. Other types of 
codes have also been systematically validated, but to a lesser extent. Under these programs, 
which include those of the IAEA, the OECD and the French CSNI, extensive experimental 
matrices for code validation have been established and the codes have been assessed in relation 
to many of the experiments that are included in those matrices. The validation exercises have 
also included comparisons with relevant data from plant operations and participation in 
international standard problems. 
 
As it has been stated previously, code qualification is not sufficient to ensure quality to the 
results of the BE analysis since analysis results are also strongly dependent on the quality of the 
input deck and the user. User and nodalization qualification aim to address this issue. The user 
effect (see Refs. /6/ and /10/) can be defined as any differences in calculations that use the same 
code version and the same specifications (e.g., initial and boundary conditions) for a given plant 
or facility. Several reasons, listed in Ref. /10/, concur to this source of uncertainty that moreover 
cannot be completely avoided.  
 
The nodalization qualification (see Refs. /3/, /6/, /11/, /12/ and /13/) means that the results, 
obtained by application of the code with the carried out nodalization, constitute a realistic 
approximation of the reference plant behavior (full size plant or facility). The key principle is to 
demonstrate, that the nodalization has (a) geometrical fidelity with the involved system, (b) 
reproduces the measured nominal steady state condition of the system, and (c) shows a 
satisfactory behavior in time dependent conditions, through a qualitative and a quantitative 
evaluation of calculation accuracy. The nodalization is qualified against data available from 
nominal stationary conditions measured in the simulated system and is tested in time-dependent 
conditions reproducing the available experimental transients. Uncertainty in the consideration of 
the boundary and initial conditions should be fully taken into account. 
 
Geometrical fidelity should be demonstrated through input data verification consisting of 
independent review and cross-checking of the input deck and confirming that no mistakes were 
made and the input deck is ready for the intended application. Input data validation provides 
confirmation of the correctness and adequacy of the plant models to provide a good 
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representation of the actual behavior of the plant systems. Examples of such practice are the 
evaluation of values like facility volume/elevation or pressure drop distribution across the loop. 
 
In general, little data exist for transients or tests performed at full plant scale, thus the 
nodalization can to be qualified using the relevant experimental tests performed in facilities, 
taking into account scaling approach, like so-called ‘Kv-scaled’ calculation applied in the 
UMAE /14//15/ methodology, or using H2TS methodology /16/, or other equivalent methodology. 
As part of the scaling process, it is essential to conduct a comprehensive systematic hierarchal 
decomposition of the systems, components and phenomena using top-down and bottom-up 
approach to ensure that all relevant scaling distortions are accounted. In that approach developed 
NPP nodalization is adapted for a comparison with the experiment by properly scaling the 
facility’s boundary and initial conditions like power, mass flow rates or ECCS capacity. In this 
case the qualification is obtained on the qualitative level demonstrating the capability of the plant 
nodalization to properly reproduce the physical phenomena occurred in the experimental test. 
When pursuing such an approach, full consideration should be given to evaluation to a 
distortions coming from scaling issues, e.g. effect of heat losses, mixing etc. 
 
The V&V as well as the qualification for user and nodalization are time consuming processes 
that have been objective of many documents in the past. Definitive and commonly agreed criteria 
for defining the acceptability of those processes do not exist, nevertheless every time in the 
present text will be mention the nodalization qualification as well as the validation of a BE-TH 
codes reference is the methods developed at UNIPI (see Refs /3/, /6/, /11/, /12/ /13/ and /14/). 
Introduction on the approaches for evaluating the uncertainty 
The first best estimate and uncertainty based methodology was the Code Scaling, Applicability 
and Uncertainty (CSAU) developed in USA in the early 90’s (see section 2.2.1 and Refs. /17/, 
/18/ and /19/). Since then a number of other methodologies, outlined in section 2.2, have been 
proposed including the GRS method, the UMAE method, etc. These methods, although sharing a 
common goal with CSAU, use different techniques and procedures to obtain the uncertainties on 
key calculated quantities. 
 
Key issues for evaluating the uncertainty in code calculation results can be synthesized by two 
main categories that include the concepts listed above: 
 
• establishing the sources of uncertainty; 
• identifying the approaches to calculate the uncertainty. 
 
An uncertainty analysis consists of identification and characterization of relevant input 
parameters (input uncertainty) as well as of the methodology to quantify the global influence of 
the combination of these uncertainties on selected output parameters (output uncertainty). These 
two main items are treated in different ways by the various methods and discussed in sections 2.1 
and 2.3. 
 
The approach based upon propagation of code input ‘uncertainties’, data of separate effects tests 
are used to quantify uncertainties related to models and correlations of the code. The integral 
tests are used to verify nodalizations and the propagation of input uncertainties. On the other side 
the method based upon propagation of calculation output ‘errors’, like the CIAU method, all 
kinds of experiment data are used to quantify the output uncertainties and to verify nodalization 
as well. 
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For sake of completeness, it should be mentioned a relevant international activity in the area of 
development, qualification and application of uncertainty methods, see Ref. /20/, promoted by 
OECD/CSNI. In the framework of this international activity five methods for calculating the 
uncertainty (GRS, IPSN, ENUSA, AEAW and UMAE) were compared. 
Overview of the BEPU applications 
The BE codes used in the area of nuclear reactor safety are reliable tools and their capabilities to 
predict accidents and transients at existing plants have substantially improved over the past 
years. This required large research efforts, still ongoing. At present they are considered suitable 
for practical needs and some applications of the BEPU can be mentioned in this section. 
 
Several applications of the BEPU are related to the analysis of the LOCA as DBA in order to 
validate the design adequacy of the ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) of water cooled 
reactors. The best estimate codes used to carry out the simulations of the LBLOCA need to be 
capable of realistically describing the transient behavior of the systems and components. The 
code models to describe important phenomena (e.g. the flashing of liquid, the critical flow, the 
decay heat, the metal-water reaction, the boiling heat transfer) should be based on the best 
estimate models. Various best estimate codes have been developed with BE models and features, 
and these codes have been used in the development of the Realistic Evaluation Method (REM) 
for LBLOCA analyses to determine the licensing PCT. 
 
The TRAC code was used in the development of CSAU (Code Scaling And Uncertainty) 
Method. The CSAU method (overviewed in section 2.2.1 and detailed described in Refs. /17/ 
and /18/) demonstrated the use of a best estimate method to assess the licensing PCT of a 4-loop 
Westinghouse PWR design. The WCOBRA/TRAC code was used in the BE-LOCA 
methodology developed by a group led by Westinghouse /19/. 
 
The RELAP5 code has been used with CIAU (Code with Internal Assessment of Uncertainty) 
methods for a number of different PWR designs. Some details about such application are in Refs. 
/21/, /22/ and /23/. 
 
GRS uncertainty method has been applied for the uncertainty evaluation of LB LOCA and 
PRISE events for VVER-440 types of reactors. In both cases ATHLET computer code was 
employed /2/.  
 
Finally another relevant applications of BEPU related to CANDU safety analysis in the LB-
LOCA events is documented in Refs. /24/, /25/ and /26/. It should be noted that such analysis 
requires use of coupled thermal-hydraulics, neutron kinetics and fuel codes. 
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1 OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
UNIPI has a long tradition in the development and validation of BE thermal hydraulic system 
codes (i.e. RELAP5), as well as in executing relevant experimental campaign in experimental 
facility (i.e. PIPER-One). Moreover it was strongly active also in developing methodologies for 
evaluating the uncertainty connected with the BE analysis. Several activities /27/ /28/ /29/ /30/ /31/ were 
devoted to the development, assessment, qualification and application such uncertainty methods. 
 
At present, the Code with capability of Internal Assessment of Uncertainty (CIAU) is the last 
tool developed for evaluating the error of the thermal-hydraulic code in predicting the NPP 
transients. It is based on two self-standing tools: a TH system code, such as CATHARE2, and an 
uncertainty methodology (UMAE). 
 
The present activity deals with the extension and the strengtheness of the CIAU procedure 
capability, allowing the application to CATHARE2 code (see section 4.1). This includes the 
creation of a database of errors specific for the French code that constitutes the “kernel” of the 
CIAU procedure (section 4.2). 
 
The objective is to develop, document, assess and qualify a reliable tool capable to be applied in 
BEPU approach to accident analysis (DBA and BDBA) and accident management. 
 
Other issues, related to the application of the BE thermal-hydraulic system codes and directly 
connected with this activity are: 
 
• the assessment of the TH-SYS codes (CATHARE2 and RELAP5) with regards to VVER-
1000 analyses; 
• the assessment of the TH-SYS codes (CATHARE2 and RELAP5) against boron transport 
phenomena; 
• the assessment of the procedure for code assessment based on UMAE through a systematic 
application of the method; 
• the assessment of the FFT-BM as supporting tool for the nodalization qualification 
process. 
 
Finally in the framework of the present activity a contribution is also furnished providing data 
for extending of the CIAU database for RELAP5. 
1.1 Description of the preformed activity 
The activity performed for fulfilling the proposed objective is outlined in Fig. 1. It is divided in 
five relevant parts, three of them connected with relevant International Projects. 
 
A preliminary part was devoted to achieve the necessary knowledge of the tools to be applied 
(i.e. CATHARE2 code, FFT-BM, UMAE and CIAU) and to collect references on their use and 
relevant applications. Moreover references on the previous activities performed in international 
formwork at UNIPI (the “milestones” in Refs. /2/, /3/ and /13/) constituted the base for address 
the final objective: to carry out a database constituted of at least 20 tests to be used in the CIAU 
procedure. 
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Fig. 1 – Outline of the performed activity: overall view. 
With reference to Fig. 1, the first step (block A, Fig. 2) was to collect and analyze the tests 
already available at UNIPI. Some of these were performed with older version of CATHARE2 
code (namely V1.3U and V1.5A)1. In particular 11 post test analyses performed by UNIPI (7) 
and CEA (3) were checked related to 9 experiments performed in LOBI/Mod2, BETHSY, 
PACTEL and LOFT facilities. Seven of them were judged qualitatively enough documented to 
be included in the database (see section 4.2 and the Appendix A). 
 
The second step (block B) of the activity, see Fig. 3, has been performed in the formwork if the 
TACIS 2.03/97 Project /13/. Such Project, founded by EC, was devoted to the development of 
accident management procedures in VVER-1000/320 NPP (with reference to Balakovo NPP 
Unit 3). The strategy proposed included a large effort for the assessment and validation of 
selected computational tools (in particular CATHARE2 and RELAP5). Twelve (plus three) 
experiments were designed and executed in the VVER-1000 simulator, namely PSB-VVER 
facility installed at Electrogorsk Research and Engineering Centre (EREC). The contribution to 
the Project was both in the pre-test and in the post-test phases. Suitable nodalizations of the 
experimental facility were designed, developed, set up and qualified. 
 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that during the research activity two version of Cathare2 code were available the first until April 
2005 was the V1.5b. Later on the version V2.5 was issued to UNIPI and used in the framework of the PKL activity. 
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Fig. 2 – Outline of the performed activity: available experimental data (block A). 
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Fig. 3 – Outline of the performed activity: TACIS 2.03/97 Project (block B). 
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The activity, documented in Ref. /13/, provided twelve tests used for the extension of the 
database (see section 4.2 and the Appendix A). 
 
Another relevant activity, schematized in Fig. 4, related to the code assessment and validation 
was the participation to the OECD PSB-VVER Project (still ongoing). In the framework of this 
Project was developed a list of PSB-VVER facility experiments aimed at the improvement of the 
RELAP5 validation matrix. Five experiments were executed (IB-LOCA, NC, SB-LOCA, 
PRISE2, and a LBLOCA3) and the experimental data were used for the qualification of the 
CATHARE2 nodalization of the facility (see Ref. /36/) and for the assessment of the 
CATHARE2, RELAP5/mod3.3 and RELAP5-3D©. The activity (see Refs /32/, /33/, /34/, /35/, 
/36/ and /37/) was finalized including three tests in the database (see section 4.2 and the 
Appendix A). 
 
The last activity /38/ /39/ outlined in Fig. 5 and aimed at the code assessment that furnished data 
useful for finalizing the database, is related to the boron transport experiments performed at 
PKL-III ITF. The experimental program is under the umbrella of the OECD/CSNI and includes 
14 experiments focused on the SBLOCA and the loss of RHRS during the mid-loop operation. 
 
Between them three relevant experiments for code assessment were analyzed with CATHARE2 
code. These post-tests, sponsored by EDF, constituted the finalization of the first database useful 
for evaluating the uncertainty and applicable with the CIAU method. The envisaged target of 
twenty tests for creating the database was successfully fulfilled and twenty-five tests adequately 
documented ware judged sufficient for the first pioneering application of the method using 
CATHARE2 code. 
 
For sake of completeness, it should be noted that the CIAU method requires a continuous up-
date and improvement of the database in order to enlarge the number of tests as much as 
possible. 
 
Once the database was finalized, the activity was the devoted to the implementation database in 
the CIAU method (see Fig. 6). Each test, already referenced, was suitably documented in order 
to provide synthetic information of each test, and assessed independently, running the CIAU 
software. The results obtained running the CIAU software with each test were also documented 
providing also relevant information. 
 
The last step, before the sample application of the database to a safety analysis calculation, is the 
qualification of the database. Two different qualifications were performed following the same 
procedure already applied for the RELAP5 database, see Ref. /20/. It consists in the internal and 
external qualification of the database for evaluating the uncertainty of the transients calculated 
with CATHARE2 code with the CIAU method. 
 
                                                 
2
 This test was selected as Analytical Exercise for the participants. A blind calculation was carried out before the test 
execution. 
3
 Full power experiment not yet performed. 
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Fig. 4 – Outline of the performed activity: OECD PSB-VVER Project (block C). 
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Fig. 5 – Outline of the performed activity: OECD SETH & PKL-III Projects (block D). 
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Fig. 6 – Outline of the performed activity: development, implementation, documentation, 
qualification and application (block E). 
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2 THE UNCERTAINTY EVALUATION METHODS  
2.1 Different approaches to calculate the uncertainty 
An uncertainty analysis consists of identification and characterization of relevant input 
parameters (input uncertainty) as well as of the methodology to quantify the global influence of 
the combination of these uncertainties on selected output parameters (output uncertainty). These 
two main items are treated in different ways by the various methods. One approach is to evaluate 
the “propagation of input uncertainties”: uncertainty is derived following the identification of 
“uncertain” input parameters with specified ranges or/and probability distributions of these 
parameters, and performing calculations varying these parameters. The propagation of input 
uncertainties can be performed either by deterministic or by probabilistic methods. The other 
approach is the ‘extrapolation of output uncertainty’: uncertainty is derived from the (output) 
uncertainty based on the comparison between calculation results and significant experimental 
data. A description of the most commonly used uncertainty methods is provided in the following 
sections, see Ref. /2/. 
2.1.1 Propagation of input uncertainties: probabilistic methods 
The probabilistic methods have the following common features: 
 
• the nuclear power plant, the code and transient to be analyzed are identified; 
• uncertainties (plant initial and boundary conditions, fuel parameters, modeling) are 
identified; 
• the methods restrict the number of input uncertainties to be included in the calculations. 
The GRS method includes all identified potentially important uncertainties. 
 
The selected input uncertainties are ranged using relevant separate effects data. The state of 
knowledge of each uncertain input parameter within its range is expressed by a subjective 
probability distribution. The word “subjective” expresses the state of knowledge rather than 
stochastic variability. Dependencies between uncertain input parameters should be identified and 
quantified. The typical path for uncertainty evaluation in this type of approach is depicted in Fig. 
7. The number ‘n’ of inputs can be as large as 105, whereas the dimension ‘m’ of outputs is not a 
main concern. The propagation of code input uncertainties implies that: 
 
• a number ‘n*’ of inputs must be selected with ‘n*’ of the order of 102 and much less than 
‘n’; 
• the ranges of variations and/or Probability Distribution Function (PDF) must be assigned to 
each of the ‘n*’ parameters. 
 
The main drawbacks of this approach are: 
 
• engineering judgment needed to select the dimension of ‘n*’ starting from ‘n’ and the 
range and/or PDF for each of the ‘n*’ parameters; 
• the error propagation occurs trough the code that, by definition, is an ‘imperfect’ tool. 
 
The following methods, described hereafter in section 2.2, belong to this type: CSAU, GRS, 
IPSN, ENUSA, Uncertainty method GSUAM used by SIEMENS (now AREVA-NP), BEAU 
method used in Canada. 
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2.1.2 Propagation of input uncertainties: deterministic methods 
The deterministic methods have the following features in common with probabilistic methods: 
 
• the code and nuclear power plant and transient are identified; 
• uncertainties (initial and boundary conditions, modeling, plant, fuel) are identified. 
 
The difference to deterministic methods is in quantifying the input parameter uncertainties. No 
subjective probability distributions are used; instead, “reasonable” uncertainty ranges or 
bounding values are specified that encompass e.g. available relevant experimental data. The 
statements of the uncertainty of code results are deterministic, not probabilistic. 
 
The methods used by EDF-AREVA, the AEAW, the DRM principles and the penalization mode 
are based on this principles and are also outlined in section 2.2. 
 
 
Fig. 7 – Uncertainty method based upon propagation of input uncertainties. 
2.1.3 Extrapolation of output uncertainty 
The basic idea of this approach is to get the uncertainty from considering the accuracy (i.e. 
discrepancy between measured and calculated value). The use of data base from counterpart and 
similar tests (similar tests are experiments performed in different scaled facilities that are 
characterized by the occurrence of the same thermal-hydraulic phenomena; counterpart tests are 
similar tests where boundary and initial conditions are imposed according to a scaling analysis.) 
in Integral Tests Facilities (ITF) is crucial for this method. The underlying assumption of this 
extrapolation method is that the direct extrapolation of experimental data is not acceptable for 
the uncertainty prediction of a nuclear power plant (NPP), but that it is reasonable to extrapolate 
the discrepancies between code results and experimental data observed for similar phenomena in 
qualified ITF. The main advantage of this approach (Fig. 8) is that there is no need to evaluate 
and to model uncertainty sources. The main drawbacks of this approach are: 
 
• The process of ‘extrapolation’ of output errors is not based upon fundamental principles: 
the concept of extrapolation of accuracy can not be demonstrated (however, proofs of 
validity can be supplied); 
• The origin of uncertainty does not appear from the results: it is impossible to distinguish 
contributions to the output error bands. 
• Range of application is limited by the database. 
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Fig. 8 – Uncertainty method based upon propagation of output uncertainties. 
2.2 Overview of different methods for evaluating the uncertainty 
2.2.1 CSAU method 
The method is intended to investigate the uncertainty of safety-related output parameters, in the 
demonstration cases these were only single-valued parameters, like PCT or minimum water 
inventory, no time dependent values. Prior to that, a procedure is used to evaluate the code 
applicability to a selected plant scenario. Experts identify phenomena, ranking them as highly 
important, examining experimental data and code predictions of the scenario under investigation. 
In the resulting Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT), ranking is accomplished 
by expert judgment. The PIRT and code documentation are evaluated, and it is decided if the 
code is applicable to the plant scenario. The CSAU methodology is described in detail in Ref. 
/17/. Further applications have been performed for a large and a small break LOCA for a PWR 
are reported in Refs. /18//19//40/. 
 
All necessary calculations are performed by using an optimized nodalization to capture the 
important physical phenomena. This nodalization represents a compromise between accuracy 
and cost, based on experience obtained by analyzing separate effects tests and integral 
experiments. No particular method or criteria are prescribed to accomplish this task. 
 
Only parameters important for the high ranked phenomena are selected to be considered as 
uncertain input parameters. The selection is based on the judgment of their influence on the 
output parameters. Additional output biases are introduced to consider the uncertainty of other 
parameters not included in the sensitivity calculations. 
 
Information from manufacturing of NPP components, experiments, and previous calculations 
performed is utilized when defining the mean value and probability distribution or standard 
deviation of uncertain parameters, for both the LB and the SB LOCA analyses. Additional biases 
can be introduced to the output uncertainties. 
 
Uniform and normal distributions were utilized in the two applications performed up to date. 
Output uncertainty is the result of the propagation of input uncertainties through a number of 
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code calculations. Input parameter uncertainty can be either due to its stochastic nature (i.e. 
code-independent) or due to un-precise knowledge of the parameter values. 
 
No statistical method for uncertainty evaluation has been formally proposed in the CSAU. A 
response surface approach has been used in the applications performed up to date. The response 
surface fits the code predictions obtained for selected parameters, and is further used instead of 
the original computer code. Such an approach then implies the use of a limited number of 
uncertain parameters, in order to reduce the number of code runs and the cost of analysis. 
However, within the CSAU frame the response surface approach is not prescribed, and other 
methods may be applied. 
 
Scaling is considered by CSAU, identifying several issues based on test facilities and on code 
assessment. The effect of scale distortions on main processes, the applicability of the existing 
database to the given NPP, the scale-up capability of closure relationships and their applicability 
to the NPP range is evaluated at a qualitative level. Biases are introduced if the scaling capability 
is not provided. 
2.2.2 GRS method 
The GRS method is a probabilistic method base on the propagation of input parameters. It has 
some other important features: 
 
• the uncertainty space of input parameters (defined by their uncertainty ranges) is sampled 
at random according to the combined subjective probability distribution of the uncertain 
parameters and code calculations are performed by sampled sets of parameters; 
• the number of code calculations is determined by the requirement to estimate a 
tolerance/confidence interval for the quantity of interest (such as PCT). Following a 
proposal by GRS Wilks’ formula /41//42/ is used to determine the number of calculations to 
derive the uncertainty bands; 
• statistical evaluations are performed to determine the sensitivities of input parameter 
uncertainties on the uncertainties of key results (parameter importance analysis). 
 
This method has no limit for the number of uncertain parameters to be considered in the analysis. 
The calculated uncertainty has a well-established probabilistic/statistical basis. Statistics is used 
for the evaluation of the uncertainty and sensitivity at a reasonable number of calculations, as 
described in Ref. /43/. 
 
For the selected plant transient, the method is applied to an integral test facility (ITF) simulating 
the same scenario prior to the plant analysis. If experimental data are not bounded, the set of 
uncertain input parameters has to be modified. 
 
Experts identify significant uncertainties to be considered in the analysis, including the modeling 
uncertainties, and the related parameters, and identify and quantify dependencies between 
uncertain parameters. Subjective probability density functions (PDFs) are used to quantify the 
state of knowledge of uncertain parameters for the specific scenario. The term “subjective” is 
used here to distinguish uncertainty due to imprecise knowledge from uncertainty due to 
stochastic or random variability. Uncertainties of code model parameters are derived based on 
validation experience. 
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The scaling effect has to be quantified as model uncertainty. Additional uncertain model 
parameters can be included or PDFs can be modified, accounting for results from separate effects 
test (SET) analysis. 
 
Input parameter values are simultaneously by random sampling according to the subjective PDFs 
and dependencies. A set of parameters is provided to perform the required number n of code 
runs. For example, the 95% fractile and 95% confidence limit of the resulting subjective 
distribution of the selected output quantities is directly obtained from the n code results, without 
assuming any specific distribution. No response surface is used. 
 
Sensitivity measures by using regression or correlation techniques from the sets of input 
parameters and from the corresponding output values allow the ranking of the uncertain input 
parameters in relation to their contribution to output uncertainty. Therefore, the ranking of 
parameters is a result of the analysis, not of prior expert judgment. The 95% fractile, 95% 
confidence limit and sensitivity measures for continuous-valued output parameters are provided. 
 
Upper statistical tolerance limits are the upper β confidence for the chosen α fractile. The fractile 
indicates the probability content of the probability distributions of the code results (e.g. α = 95% 
means that PCT is below the tolerance limit with at least α = 95% probability). One can be β % 
confident that at least α % of the combined influence of all the characterized uncertainties are 
below the tolerance limit. The confidence level is specified because the probability is not 
analytically determined. It accounts for the possible influence of the sampling error due to the 
fact that the statements are obtained from a random sample of limited size. The smallest number 
n of code runs to be performed is given by the Wilks’ formula (Refs. /41/ and /42/): 
 
100100
1
n βα ≥





−  
Eq. 1 
 
is representing the size of a random sample (a number of calculations) such that the maximum 
calculated value in the sample is an upper statistical tolerance limit. The required number n of 
code runs for the upper 95% fractile is: 59 at 95% confidence level, 45 at 90% confidence level, 
32 at 80% confidence level. 
 
For two-sided statistical tolerance intervals (investigating the output parameter distribution 
within an interval) the formula is: 
 
( ) βααα ≥−−− −1nn 1n1  Eq. 2 
 
The minimum number of calculations can be found in the following table. 
 
 
One-sided statistical tolerance 
limits  
Two-sided statistical tolerance 
limits 
β / α 0.90 0.95 0.99  0.90 0.95 0.99 
0.90 22 45 230  38 77 388 
0.95 29 59 299  46 93 473 
0.99 44 90 459  64 130 662 
Tab. 2 - Minimum number of calculations n for one-sided and two-sided statistical tolerance 
limit. 
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For regulatory purposes where the margin to licensing criteria is of primary interest, the one-
sided tolerance limit may be applied, i.e. for a 95th/ 95th percentile 59 calculations should be 
performed. 
 
As a consequence, the number n of code runs is independent of the number of selected input 
uncertain parameters, only depending on the percentage of the fractile and on the desired 
confidence level percentage. The number of code runs for deriving sensitivity measures is also 
independent of the number of parameters. As an example, a total number of 100 runs was carried 
out in the analysis of a reference reactor, using 50 parameters. 
2.2.3 ENUSA method 
The ENUSA method is basically the same as the GRS method and the CSAU framework. Wilks’ 
formula is used, like in the GRS method; no use of response surfaces has been made. The 
number of input parameters, however, has been limited through a PIRT process, as in the 
application described in Ref. /20/. The reason was to limit the effort for deriving input 
uncertainty distributions. Therefore, all the information reported in relation to the GRS method 
applies to the ENUSA method. 
2.2.4 IPSN method 
The IPSN method is basically the same as the GRS method. In Ref. /20/ the method was applied 
taking into account only “basic uncertainties”, coming from the constitutive equations in the 
code have been considered. Therefore, all the information reported in relation to the GRS 
method hereafter also applies to the IPSN method. 
2.2.5 Uncertainty method GSUAM used by SIEMENS (now Framatome-ANP) 
The GSUAM (Generic Statistical Uncertainty Analysis Methodology) constitutes a “proprietary” 
uncertainty method developed by Siemens (Framatome-ANP, now AREVA NP). It has been 
used to support the licensing process of the Angra-2 NPP /44/. 
 
GSUAM aims at the evaluation of point values, like peak cladding temperature, for the 
uncertainty, not for time-dependent quantification of the uncertainty of code results. The method 
includes general features similar to CSAU framework. Three main contributions to uncertainty 
are identified: 
 
• code; 
• NPP conditions;  
• fuel conditions. 
 
Among those elements, “the code” constitutes the largest source of overall uncertainty. This is 
derived from the comparison between experimental and calculated data following an approach 
similar to the UMAE, see section 2.3.1. 
 
In order to address the remaining uncertainty sources, sensitivity studies are performed following 
the identification of uncertainty input parameters and the related range of variation. 
 
A statistical method is used to combine the uncertainty data derived from the three uncertainty 
sources. 
2.2.6 BEAU method used in Canada 
In Canada a Best Estimate and Uncertainty Methodology (BEAU) has been developed and 
applied by the utility Ontario Power Generation (OPG) /45/ and by the vendor Atomic Energy of 
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Canada Ltd. (AECL) /46/. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) published lessons 
learned by trial applications and regulatory expected features of a best-estimate analysis /47/. 
Further applications have been performed to investigate the first power pulse during a large 
break LOCA in a CANDU reactor (that has a positive void coefficient). The approach being 
taken is consistent with the CSAU framework and approximately similar to the CSAU 
demonstration applications. A PIRT process is performed, and a response surface is used based 
on computer code calculations. A large number of calculations were performed using the 
response surface to replace the computer code. A probabilistic uncertainty statement, i.e. 95th 
percentile values, is derived. The main focus is on plant parameter uncertainties. These 
applications were reviewed by an international expert panel /48/. 
2.2.7 AEAW method 
This method considers the deterministic nature of most of the involved processes, and utilizes no 
statistical procedures /17/. 
 
For the investigated scenario, experts identify the relevant phenomena and select the most 
important uncertain parameters. Physical reasons are provided for each selected parameter, i.e. 
why it might contribute to the uncertainty of the key output parameters. 
 
A “reasonable” uncertainty range is specified for each parameter, defined as “the smallest range 
of values that includes all the values for which there is not reasonable certainty that they are 
inconsistent with all available evidence”. 
 
Experimental data examination supports the characterization phase of modeling uncertainties, 
generally from SET facilities. Bounding models are built in a way to predict, for any parameter 
combination, acceptable upper and lower limits for the assessed quantity. Alternatively, 
deviations of code predictions compared with SET data are combined, choosing bounding 
deviations to be included into code predictions, so being quite certain about bounding all 
available deviations. 
 
No general method is proposed to evaluate the range of output uncertainties. Standard and 
bounding values are utilized to address the uncertainties. Code runs with single or multiple 
parameter variations are carried out in order to define those combined variations believed 
maximizing or minimizing the addressed output quantity, thus obtaining reasonable bounding 
uncertainty ranges. 
 
This implies that the number of code runs increases with the number of uncertain parameters. 
During the variation analysis phase, assigning two values for each parameter other than the 
standard value, results in about 2N+1 code runs in the case of N parameters. Additional runs 
arise from aiming at maximizing or minimizing the output quantity. 
 
The code applicability to a nuclear power plant calculation is anticipated by using the method for 
an integral test taken from an independent database, to check if experimental data are within the 
determined ranges. If not, it is concluded that changes of the input uncertainty ranges or the 
combination of uncertainties or further code development is necessary. 
 
The processes involving scaling effects, modeling and quantifying the related uncertainty, are 
taken into account by experts judgment. The adopted system code must be able to treat the scale 
of the addressed transient. 
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2.2.8 Method used by EDF-FRAMATOME 
Electricité de France (EDF) and Framatome (now AREVA NP) have developed an accident 
analysis method /49/ based on the use of realistic computer codes: the “Deterministic Realistic 
Method” (DRM). Its principle is based on quantification of the calculation uncertainty, which is 
taken into account deterministically when the results (uncertainty parameters) are compared to 
the acceptance criteria. To ensure that the value of a uncertainty parameter is conservative, a 
penalization mode is introduced into the realistic model. The penalties are chosen so as to 
preserve a realistic response of the code. The DRM was applied to a LB-LOCA for a French 
three-loop PWR. 
 
Since 1974, and the publication of the original 10 CFR 50.46 rule significant improvements have 
been made in the understanding and modeling of LOCA phenomena, and the methods specified 
in Appendix K to demonstrate the acceptability of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 
have proved to be overly conservative. Since 1988 and the revision of 10 CFR 50.46 /50/ ECC 
analyses may be carried out with realistic models, provided that the uncertainty in the calculation 
results is estimated with a high confidence level, ensuring a high probability that the safety 
criteria will not be reached. In order to cope with the evolution of the rule, EdF and Framatome 
decided to jointly develop a new methodology, the Deterministic Realistic Methodology (DRM), 
used in association with CATHARE, the French best estimate code dedicated to thermal-
hydraulic safety analyses /51/. This methodology, based on statistical and deterministic 
approaches, consists in deriving from the statistical analysis, that is performed to quantify the 
uncertainties, a deterministic method that produces results enveloping the previously estimated 
uncertainties, while at the same time preserving the realistic nature of the simulation, as shown 
by /49/. DRM is a general approach applicable to all types of accident scenarios. 
2.2.9 DRM principles 
The code uncertainties have two main contributions: 
 
• the uncertainty in the initial and boundary conditions, 
• the uncertainty in the physical code models. 
 
The objective of the DRM is to quantify the overall uncertainty by means of a statistical analysis. 
The code CATHARE V1.3L was used, as it can provide a BE evaluation of all the most 
important, dominant physical phenomena of the transient. The resulting realistic plant model is 
qualified by comparison with relevant experimental tests. 
 
The realistic plant model calculates each output parameter (e.g. peak cladding temperature, oxide 
layer thickness) both at the BE or most probable level and at the 95% probability level. 
 
For the 95% probability level, uncertainties of the code, of the plant and fuel parameter 
uncertainties, are accounted for. 
 
In the deterministic evaluation model, the uncertainty of the output parameter is bounded, by 
defining a penalization mode that ensures conservative results. The value of the parameter 
resulting from the DRM approach is therefore higher than the 95% confidence level value of the 
same parameter calculated using the statistical method. 
 
The pertinence of the penalties introduced into the DRM plant model results from physical and 
statistical analyses. As far as possible, the penalties are directly assigned to the parameters that 
generate them, in order to minimize the conservatism, and to preserve the realistic response of 
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the code. In this way, the DRM model differs from the previous deterministic “Appendix K” 
evaluation models /49/, in which the penalization mode was defined a priori. Nevertheless it must 
be noted that the safety demonstration relies on the 95% confidence level value of the 
uncertainty parameter. The objective of the deterministic model is only to provide an industrial 
tool for all application calculations needed for NPP safety assessment. Implementation of the 
DRM approach can be divided into four action phases as follows: 
 
1) Justification of the realistic nature of the model used. 
The capability of the code for simulating the dominant physical phenomena of the transient is 
checked. This analysis is based on the code characteristics and assessment (described in the code 
documentation). The capacity of the reactor model for enabling realistic predictions can also be 
evaluated on the basis of simulating relevant experiments. This analysis can lead to 
implementing additional models in the code.  
 
2) Estimation of the overall uncertainty  
A methodology is applied to quantify the overall uncertainty of the transient uncertainty 
parameters resulting from combination of the basic uncertainties. The method is derived from the 
CSAU procedure developed by the USNRC /52/. It focuses on the impact of the dominant 
phenomena relative to the scenario considered. The basic uncertainties are estimated for the key 
code models on the basis of calculation/experiment comparisons. The propagation of the basic 
uncertainties through a reactor calculation is assessed by means of a statistical method. The PDF 
of the uncertainty parameter is determined using a response surface, associated with Monte Carlo 
random sampling of the elementary parameters. The impact of the biases that are not rectifiable 
is added to the PDF of the uncertainty parameter, from which the 95% confidence level value is 
determined. For the LB LOCA, this analysis is done for each PCT independently. 
 
3) Penalization 
Development of a penalization mode is based on the formally described analysis. The chosen 
penalization enables to enveloping in a reasonably conservative manner the determined 
uncertainties. It is specific to each type of transient and each criterion to be verified. Moreover, 
the chosen penalization must not distort the prediction of the system effects, which intervene as 
boundary conditions for the hot fuel assembly calculation. It is therefore better to introduce the 
conservatism on the parameters making the major contribution to the uncertainty but that do not 
present a risk of alteration of the system behavior. For the LB LOCA, the penalization mode is 
the same for all the PCTs. 
 
4) Evaluating the conservatism 
Demonstration of the conservative nature of the DRM model, as in the interim approach 
proposed by the USNRC /53/, relies on the comparison of the DRM uncertainty parameter values 
with the 95% confidence level values determined by the statistical analysis. The range of 
applicability of the DRM model is defined by the list of dominant phenomena considered for the 
analysis. A verification, or even a new evaluation, of the uncertainty at 95% confidence level is 
required only if the differences in the reactor design characteristics, the characteristics related to 
nuclear parameters, or the technical specifications reveal new dominant physical phenomena (or 
if they modify the sensitive factors considered in the statistical analysis). 
2.2.10 The penalization mode 
The statistical method applied to a realistic plant model enables estimating the peak temperatures 
of the fuel rod cladding during a LB LOCA transient, with a confidence level greater than 95%. 
A deterministic evaluation model, called DRM model, is derived from the realistic plant model 
by introducing a penalization mode that covers the overall calculation uncertainty. The 
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mainspring of the DRM model is to provide a simple industrial tool. It is used to perform 
application calculations needed for NPP safety assessment, instead of the statistical method, 
which remains the reference tool. The principles presiding over the choice of penalization mode 
are the objective of non-distortion of the transient physics, and that of introducing penalties as 
close as possible to the sources of uncertainty. 
2.3 The UNIPI approach: UMAE method and CIAU procedure 
2.3.1 UMAE method 
The method focuses not on the evaluation of individual parameter uncertainties but on direct 
scaling of data from an available database, calculating the final uncertainty by extrapolating the 
accuracy evaluated from relevant integral experiments to full scale NPPs, as described by Ref. 
/54/. The simplified flow diagram of the method is in Fig. 9. 
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Fig. 9.   Simplified flow chart of the UMAE. 
Considering integral test facilities of a reference LWR, and qualified computer codes based on 
advanced models, the method relies on code capability, qualified by application to facilities of 
increasing scale. Direct data extrapolation from small scale experiments to reactor scale is 
difficult due to the imperfect scaling criteria adopted in the design of each scaled down facility. 
So, only the accuracy (i.e. the difference between measured and calculated quantities) is 
extrapolated. Experimental and calculated data in differently scaled facilities are used to 
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demonstrate that physical phenomena and code predictive capabilities of important phenomena 
do not change when increasing the dimensions of the facilities; however, available integral 
effects test facility scales are far away from reactor scale. 
 
Other basic assumptions are that phenomena and transient scenarios in larger scale facilities are 
close enough to plant conditions. The influence of user and nodalization upon the output 
uncertainty is minimized in the methodology. However, user and nodalization inadequacies 
affect the comparison between measured and calculated trends; the error due to this is considered 
in the extrapolation process and gives a contribution to the overall uncertainty. 
 
The method utilizes a database from similar tests and counterpart tests performed in ITFs that are 
representative of NPP conditions. The quantification of code accuracy is carried out by using a 
procedure based on the Fast Fourier Transform characterizing the discrepancies between code 
calculations and experimental data in the frequency domain, and defining figures of merit for the 
accuracy of each calculation4. 
 
Calculations of both ITFs and NPPs transients are used to attain uncertainty from accuracy. 
Discretized models and nodalizations are set up and qualified against experimental data by an 
iterative procedure, requiring that a reasonable level of accuracy is satisfied. Similar criteria are 
adopted in developing plant nodalization and in performing plant transient calculations. The 
demonstration of the similarity of the phenomena exhibited in test facilities and in plant 
calculations, accounting for scaling laws considerations, leads to the Analytical Simulation 
Model (ASM), i.e. a qualified nodalization of the plant. 
 
No limitation on the number of input uncertain parameters is considered in the application of the 
method. The related input parameter variation ranges are reflected in the output parameter 
variation ranges; it is not possible to establish a correspondence between each input and each 
output parameter without performing additional specific calculations that are not within the 
purposes of UMAE. The process starts from the experimental and calculated database. Following 
the identification of the physical phenomena (e.g. from CSNI validation matrix) involved in the 
selected transient scenario, Relevant Thermal-hydraulic Aspects (RTA) are utilized to evaluate 
the acceptability of code calculations, the similarity among experimental data, and the similarity 
between plant calculation results and available data. Statistical treatment is pursued in order to 
process accuracy values calculated for the various test facilities and to get uncertainty ranges 
with 95% confidence level. These are superimposed as uncertainty bands bracketing the ASM 
calculation. 
 
The scaling of both experimental and calculated data is explicitly assessed in the frame of the 
analysis. In fact, the demonstration of phenomena scalability is necessary for the application of 
the method and for the evaluation of the uncertainty associated with the prediction of the NPP 
scenario. 
 
Comparison of thermalhydraulic data from experimental facilities of different scale constitutes 
the basis of the UMAE. Special steps and procedures are included in the UMAE, to check if a 
nodalization and code calculation results are acceptable or not. Adequate experimental database 
including the same phenomena as in the selected test scenario of the NPP is needed for the 
                                                 
4
 FFT, implemented into the FFTBM method is used for the acceptability check of the calculations (in the UMAE the ratio 
experimental to calculated value is used for the extrapolation, see section 3.1). Then the FFT based method is independent with 
respect to the philosophy of UMAE: it is used as a tool. The use of this procedure avoids the influence of engineering judgment 
in evaluating the adequacy of code results. 
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application of this method. For a successful application it is necessary that the accuracy of the 
calculations will not dramatically decrease with increasing scale of the experimental facilities. 
The demonstration that accuracy increases when increasing the dimensions of the object facility 
would be (a sufficiently large database is acquired, not fully available now) a demonstration of 
the consistency of the basic idea of the method. 
2.3.2 Availability of a method for the Internal Assessment of Uncertainty 
All of the uncertainty evaluation methods are affected by two main limitations, as already 
mentioned: 
 
• the resources needed for their application may be very demanding, ranging to up to several 
man-years; 
• the achieved results may be strongly method/user dependent; 
• the last item should be considered together with the code-user effect, widely studied in the 
past (see Ref. /4/), and may threaten the usefulness or the practical applicability of the 
results achieved by an uncertainty method. Therefore, the Internal Assessment of 
Uncertainty (IAU) was requested as the follow-up of an international conference /55/. The 
approach CIAU, Code with capability of IAU, described in Chapter 1, has been 
developed with the objective of reducing the limitations discussed above. 
 
The description of the procedure is reported in Chapter 1. 
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3 CIAU PROCEDURE 
3.1 Relevant principles 
3.1.1 Accuracy and uncertainty 
The acceptability of a calculated parameter is connected with definition of accuracy and 
uncertainty (Eq. 3). These two concepts are related to the error that the calculated parameter 
trends have in comparison with the experimental data, for a given transient. It should be noted 
that in this case for error between calculated and experimental data is not considered the capacity 
to predict the thermal hydraulic phenomenon, but only the difference between the values of the 
experimental measurement and the code calculation in predicting a transient. 
 
The accuracy defines the error between the calculated and the experimental data. The 
mathematical expression for accuracy is: 
 
c
ce
Y
YYA −=  Eq. 3 
 
where 
A is the accuracy; 
Ye  is the experimental value; 
Yc  is the calculated value. 
 
Therefore the accuracy is a calculated number meaningful, for a given test executed on a specific 
experimental facility. This implies that this value cannot be applied to a NPP calculation directly 
if the accuracy values are not extrapolated in order to obtain the uncertainty. 
 
The methodology described in section 3.2 is based on the acquisition of accuracy data in order to 
be able to extrapolate the uncertainty. The method used for extrapolating the uncertainty is the 
same used in the UMAE methodology described in section 2.3.1. 
 
For this reason large effort is necessary for accumulating a large number of accuracy data that in 
the CIAU method are divided in two databases: the Quantity Accuracy Matrix (QAM) and the 
Time Accuracy Vector (TAV). 
 
The accuracy is also used in the UMAE method and it assumes different specific meanings 
depending upon the relative phases of the methodology taken into consideration. Tab. 3 
highlights the different concepts of accuracy with respect to the different phases of the UMAE 
method and the CIAU procedure. 
 
It must be noted that in the UMAE method the accuracy concept is also considered for the 
acceptability of the experimental data, but with different meaning: in this phase it provides a 
criteria (qualitatively, items I, II, III and quantitatively, items IV in Tab. 3) for valuating the 
acceptability of the calculation results. In this phase the accuracy is a tool for checking and not 
for determined the error (item V in Tab. 3). 
 
The quantitative accuracy evaluation, performed though the use of the FFT-BM for the 
calculated results, is not the accuracy quantification carried out by the CIAU procedure, but it is 
a phase of the procedure for qualifying nodalization and the post test analyses included in the 
University of Pisa - DIMNP - 48 - Section 3 
 Ph. D. Thesis in Nuclear Safety - XIX Cycle 
Alessandro Del Nevo - January 2007 - Page 48 of 258 
database as well as for assessing the code. Since, the accuracy of the CIAU procedure determines 
the error between experimental and calculated results, but it does not determine, if the results of 
the calculations are acceptable or not. 
 
Type Identification 
method Involved parameters Finalization 
Acceptability 
criteria 
I Qualitative Use of Key Ph. Key Ph.  
• Acceptability of facilities 
• Acceptability of experiments 
• Acceptability of calculation 
Correspondence 
(existing in both 
involved DB) and  
• Excellent 
• Reasonable 
• Minimum  
• Unsadisfactory 
II Qualitative RTA first step RTA 
• Similarity between experiments 
DB 
• Similarity between calculated 
and experimental DB 
• Nodalization (ITF and ASM) 
qualification 
Correspondence 
(existing in both 
involved DB) 
III Qualitative RTA second step 
• TSE 
• IPA 
• SVP 
• NPA 
As above 
• Excellent 
• Reasonable 
• Minimum  
• Unsadisfactory 
IV Quantitative FFT-BM More than 20 significant trends Calculation acceptability 
AA_tot < 0.4 
AA_p < 0.1 
V Quantitative AFE 
• Primary side pressure 
• Primary mass inventory 
• Cladding temperature 
Accuracy extrapolation 
Involved DB 
acceptability from 
previous method point 
of view 
Tab. 3 – Accuracy definitions 
The uncertainty is the error that it has to be added to the calculation results obtained with a 
specific code (usually it should be a NPP simulation). The uncertainty is not directly evaluated, 
but in the UMAE method it is the result of the accuracy extrapolation process. Moreover, the 
uncertainty is a general concept that in this case does not depend by a specific test and it is the 
result of the process coming from the method. 
 
A narrow uncertainty means that the BE analysis (for a given transient) carries out a prediction 
close to that occurring in the real NPP. Vice versa smallest is the difference between the 
experimental and the calculated data and larger is the accuracy. 
3.1.2 The NPP status approach 
The usual characterization of any transient or event occurred or calculated in a typical LWR 
(Light Water Reactor) is through a number of time trends, i.e. pressures, levels, temperatures, 
mass flow-rates versus time. The event time, or the time elapsed since the event beginning, 
constitutes the main way to characterize the transient together with the initial and boundary 
conditions. In this case, which can be identified as ‘time-domain’, time is taken as horizontal 
axis in the graphical representation of the transient evolution. Therefore, in the area of 
uncertainty evaluation, each transient becomes unique, thus requiring a specific evaluation of the 
error that characterizes any of the time trends. This is true notwithstanding the possibility to 
consider Key Phenomena or Relevant Thermalhydraulic Aspects (RTAs), that are common to 
classes of transients. 
 
A different way to look at the same transients involves the use of the ‘phase-space’. This 
approach consists in selecting a fixed, small group of quantities (called driving quantities - Qd) 
and in describing any event taking place in a NPP not as a function of time, but by the group of 
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values assumed by the selected quantities: each group of the selected variables represent a status 
of the plant. This approach is actually utilized to optimize the emergency procedures of NPPs. 
 
In the graphical representation, any relevant quantity can be used in the vertical or horizontal 
axis. The comparison among data of five experiments reproducing LBLOCA (Large Break Loss 
of Coolant Accident), SBLOCA (Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident) and LOFW (Loss Of 
Feed-Water) scenarios in PWR simulators gives an idea of differences between the ‘time-
domain’ and the ‘phase-space’ approaches, Ref. /56/. 
 
Time-domain and phase-space representations for relevant quantities measured during the five 
experiments 
 
1. BETHSY 6.2TC – SBLOCA (duration 2650s), 
2. LSTF SB-CL-21 – SBLOCA (duration 2250s), 
3. LOFT L2.5 – LBLOCA (duration 120s), 
4. SPES SP-FW-02 – LOFW (duration 6600s), 
5. LOBI BT17 – LOFW (duration 6390s), 
 
can be seen in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively. Differences in the two sets of graphics are 
obvious. The basic idea of the CIAU is that at any of the regions into which the phase-space is 
subdivided can be assigned one uncertainty value for the selected output quantities (called object 
quantities Y). In other words, the NPP status is a region of phase-space where the uncertainty in 
the code prediction is assumed to be uniform. 
 
 
 
a) primary system pressure b) cladding temperature 
Fig. 10.   Comparison in the ‘time-domain’ among selected quantity evolutions 
  
a) primary system mass inventory versus pressure b) cladding temperature versus primary system mass inventory 
Fig. 11.   Comparison in the “phase-space” among selected quantity evolutions. 
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The same idea, referring to specific thermal-hydraulic phenomena, is discussed in Ref. /57/. The 
phenomenological areas or regions in the phase-space are suitable for the use in scaling and 
extrapolation studies. Additional support for planning the method came from the characterization 
of generic NPP status for the actuation of accident management countermeasures, as discussed in 
Ref. /58/. Finally, the pursued approach is similar to what proposed by D.C. Groeneveld and P. 
Kirillov /59/: in that case, pressure, quality and flow rate are entered into the look-up table that 
produces a suitable value for the CHF (Critical Heat Flux). In the present case, proper driving 
quantities are entered into matrices and vector and produce uncertainty values. 
 
The concept of plant status is introduced in order to implement the idea into the uncertainty 
evaluation process. Reference is made to any transient situation assumed to occur in BWR or 
PWR equipped Nuclear Power Plants. No distinction is made among DBA (Design Basis 
Accident), BDBA (Beyond BBA), operational transients or transients involving multiple failures. 
The only boundaries are constituted by the values assumed by the considered transient driving 
quantities. However, the hypothesis is made that the transients do not evolve toward situations 
that imply core degradation and loss of geometric integrity. It must be stressed that the code 
validation must be proved within the fixed boundaries or ranges of variation of the assigned 
parameters. 
 
Referring to any plant transient scenario (i.e. SBLOCA, LBLOCA, Transient or Operational 
Transient), the status of a plant can be characterized by six driving quantities (Qd) and by the 
transient time (t). In the case of a PWR the six quantities are: 
 
1. the upper plenum pressure (Q1), 
2. the primary loop mass inventory (including pressurizer) (Q2), 
3. the steam generator pressure (Q3), 
4. the cladding surface temperature at 2/3 of core active length (starting from the bottom of 
the Active Fuel) (Q4), where the maximum value occurring in one horizontal core cross 
section is considered, 
5. the core power (Q5), 
6. the steam generator downcomer collapsed liquid level (Q6), if levels are different in the 
various steam generators, the largest value is considered. 
 
These are listed as (1) to (6) in Tab. 5. The transient time needs the specification of a ‘zero’ (t = 
0s) value starting from normal operating conditions. 
 
The hypothesis here is that a stable steady state (or stationary) situation must occur, or be 
specified when a code calculation is concerned, before t=0s. If a BWR is considered, five driving 
quantities apply, i.e. all of the above except the one at item c). In this case, the quantity at item f) 
is the Reactor Pressure Vessel downcomer level. 
 
In relation to each of the driving quantities and the transient time, upper and lower boundaries 
must be fixed together with a minimum-optimal number of intervals. An example of a possible 
quantities and time related subdivision is in Tab. 4. Six dimensions constitute the phase-space 
domain, a) to f) above, five in the case of BWR. Each combination of intervals identifies one 
hypercube in that domain. 
 
Therefore, a hypercube and a time interval characterize a unique plant status in the frame of 
uncertainty evaluation. All plant statuses are the defined by a matrix of hypercubes and by a 
vector of time intervals. 
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Time (s) Hypercube(N°) Time Intervals (N°) 
From 0 to 1 843453 1 
From 2 to 3 733453 from 2 to 3 
From 4 to 8 733353 from 4 to 8 
From 9 to18 733352 from 9 to 18 
From 19 to41 733353 from 19 to 41 
From 42 to 46 723343 from 42 to 46 
From 47 to 73 623343 from 47 to 73 
From 74 to120 523343 from 74 to 109 
From 120 to128 523333 from 110 to 114 
From 129 to 138 523332 from 115 to 119 
From 139 to 144 513332 from 116 to 122 
From 145 to156 513433 from 117 to 128 
From 157 to160 513333 from 129 to 130 
From 161 to 196 513332 from 131 to 148 
From 197 to 258 513233 from 149 to 179 
From 259 to 414 413233 from 179 to 257 
From 415 to 496 313233 from 258 to 298 
From 497 to 800 213233 from 299 to 450 
Tab. 4.  Example: hypercubes and time intervals interested by the LSTF transient SB-CL-18 
as a function of the physical time (taken form RELAP5 database) 
The definition of time and quantity uncertainty can be drawn from Fig. 12. The dotted line is the 
result of a system code calculation: Y is a generic thermalhydraulic code output plotted versus 
time. Each point value in the curve is affected by a quantity error (Uq) and by a time error (Ut). 
Owing to the uncertainty, each point value may take any value within the rectangle identified by 
the quantity and the time errors (Fig. 12c). The amount of error, each edge of the rectangle, can 
be defined in probabilistic terms, consistently with what recommended by current licensing 
approaches; e.g., a 95% probability level is considered acceptable to the NRC staff for 
comparison of best-estimate predictions of postulated transients to the licensing limits in 10 CFR 
(Code of Federal Regulations) Part 50, Ref. /60/. The way used to combine the rectangles at the 
end of the CIAU process can be seen in Fig. 12d. 
 
PWR -
DRIVING 
QUANTITIES 
(Qd) 
(1) 
UP or PRZ 
pressure (MPa) 
(2) 
Primary Circuit 
Mass Inventory 
(%)a 
(3) 
SG Pressure 
(MPa) 
(4) 
Cladding 
temperature (K) 
(5) 
Core 
Power (%)a 
(6) 
SG Level (%)a 
BWR -
DRIVING 
QUANTITIES 
(Qd) 
(1) 
UP Pressure 
(MPa) 
(2) 
Primary Circuit 
Mass Inventory 
(%)a 
Not Present 
(3) 
Cladding 
Temperature 
(K) 
(4) 
Core 
Power 
(%)a 
(5) 
Downcomer 
Level 
(%)a 
1 0.09 – 0.5 10 – 40 0.1 – 3.0 298 – 473 0.5 – 1.0 0 – 50 
2 0.5 – 2.0 40 – 80 3.0 – 7.0 473 – 573 1.0 – 6.0 50 – 100 
3 2.0 – 4.0 80 – 100 7.0 – 9.0 573 – 643 6.0 – 50 100 – 150 
4 4.0 – 5.0 100 – 120 - 643 – 973 50 – 100 - 
5 5.0 – 7.0 - - 973 – 1473 100 – 130 - 
6 7.0 - 9.0 - - - - - 
7 9.0 – 10.0 - - - - - 
8 10.0 – 15.0 - - - - - Hy
pe
rc
u
be
 
In
te
rv
a
ls 
(p
d) 
9 15.0 – 18.0 - - - - - 
a: Percent of the Initial (nominal) Value 
Tab. 5.   Subdivision of driving quantities (Q) into intervals. 
A Quantity Uncertainty Matrix (QUM) and a Time Uncertainty Vector (TUV) can be set up, 
utilizing the definitions in Fig. 12. 
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No. Transient duration (physical time) (s) 
Period 
(s) Time Step (s) Time Intervala 
1 0-100 0 - 100 1. From 1 to 100 
0 - 100 1. From 1 to 100 2 0-1000 100 - 1000 2. From 101 to550 
0 - 100 1. From 1 to 100 
100 - 1000 2. From 101 to 550 3 0-10000 
1000 - 10000 5. From 551 to 2350 
0 - 100 1. From 1 to 100 
100 - 1000 2. From 101 to 550 
1000 - 10000 5. From 551 to 2350 4 > 10000 
> 10000 10. From 2350 to ∞ 
*   Applicable to a generic ITF or NPP transient. 
a   Used in TUV 
Tab. 6.   Subdivision of transient time into intervals*. 
 
Time 
Y 
Uq 
Calc. 
Exp. 
Time 
Y 
Ut 
Calc. 
Exp. 
a) Only time error is present b) Only quantity error is present 
Time 
Y Ut Uq 
c) Combination of errors 
Y 
Time 
d) Derivation of continuous uncertainty bands 
 
Fig. 12.   Definition of quantity and of time errors to be included into the QUM and the TUV. 
Additional considerations are given hereafter: 
 
• Upper and lower limits of the driving quantities Qd (Tab. 5) reflect either the physically 
allowed values or the boundaries of validation of system codes. 
• The range of each interval (pd) in the quantity (Tab. 5) and in the time vector (Tab. 6) is 
arbitrary. A decrease in the range signifies an increase in the number of intervals and, 
even more, in the number of hypercubes. The validity in the selection of those ranges can 
be verified a posteriori, when the QUM and the TUV are filled by data. 
• The total number of hypercubes considering the intervals in Tab. 5 equals about 8100. 
However, not all the combinations of intervals are realistic, e.g. very low pressures and 
very high core power might be inconsistent. In practical terms this only means that some 
hypercubes will never be touched by any transient and, most probably, will not include 
uncertainty data. 
• Short lasting (few tens of seconds) LBLOCA, long lasting (several hundreds or even 
thousands seconds) SBLOCA or very long lasting (up to tens thousand seconds) 
Transients, even without loss of primary loop integrity, produce quantity uncertainty data 
that may concern the same hypercubes. However, the actual uncertainty that characterizes 
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the values of a generic quantity, during a short lasting or a long lasting transient, is 
different because this is the combination of quantity and time values (Fig. 12). The error 
corresponding to the time value uncertainty is a ‘never decreasing’ function of time. In 
the database gathered so far, no systematic differences between uncertainty values of 
different origins have been detected. Nevertheless, data from SBLOCA, LBLOCA, 
Transients and Operational Transients that originate quantity uncertainty suitable for the 
CIAU QUM and TUV are distinguished. 
• Uncertainty data are continuously gathered and combined, in the same way in which the 
CHF Groeneveld look-up tables (Ref. /59/) are set up and qualified. When a reasonable 
number of data is available for each hypercube, the consistency in the selection of the 
hypercube range can be checked together with the hypothesis of mixing relevant data 
from SBLOCA, LBLOCA and transients. 
• Each transient scenario in a nuclear plant evolves throughout a series of subsequent status. 
Each time the event touches a hypercube and a time interval (i.e. a plant status), it takes 
proper uncertainty values. In this way, the entire event can be associated with uncertainty 
bands. 
3.2 CIAU procedure 
The development of the capability of Internal Assessment of Uncertainty (IAU) requires a 
qualified system code and a suitable uncertainty methodology. However, any of the available 
system codes or of the uncertainty methodologies can be combined to get a Code with Internal 
Assessment of Uncertainty (CIAU). A simplified flow diagram of the CIAU is given in Fig. 13, 
where two main parts can be seen: the former deals with the development of the method and the 
latter with its application. 
 
The CIAU development took benefit from the experience gained in the development of the 
UMAE uncertainty methodology. Many of the procedures used for the uncertainty method 
proposal are also adopted here (see also below). This is especially true for the statistical 
treatment of the accuracy data. Differences between adopted procedures are discussed hereafter 
in more detail. 
3.2.1 CIAU development 
The development of the method implies the availability of qualified experimental data (block a 
in Fig. 13), of qualified system codes calculation results (block b), of postulated transients 
including the definition of plant status (block c) and the selection of variables in relation to 
which the uncertainty must be calculated (block e). The support of experimental data (block a) is 
considered mandatory, whatever is the qualification process. Qualified code results (block b) 
signify the run of qualified code in a qualified computer/compiler, by a qualified user using a 
qualified nodalization, sse Ref. /61/. The qualification level of the code results is evaluated from 
a qualitative and a quantitative point of view, making use of the FFTBM /14/. 
 
Any uncertainty methodology, supported by a system code, can be used at block b for producing 
data that are concerned with block c, thus producing an uncertainty database. Thousands of 
variables are the output of a code calculation and are utilized to characterize a postulated 
transient scenario. It may result impractical and non-necessary to evaluate the uncertainty 
connected with any quantity. Therefore, three variables have been selected for uncertainty 
evaluation: the system pressure taken in the upper plenum of the main vessel, the (maximum) 
rod cladding temperature at 2/3 core active length and the fluid mass inventory in the primary 
circuit. It may be noted that the above quantities are the same as those utilized for characterizing 
plant status. 
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Fig. 13.   Simplified flow diagram of CIAU procedure. 
If the UMAE uncertainty methodology is used (bounded area in Fig. 13, see also section 2.3.1), 
relevant experimental data and code calculation results (blocks a and b) are compared. Accuracy 
is evaluated qualitatively and quantitatively, block d. If accuracy is acceptable, block d, the 
Quantity Accuracy Matrix (QAM) and the Time Accuracy Vector (TAV) are generated, blocks f 
and g, respectively. 
 
Now, the various plant statuses identified under block c can be filled by data coming from block 
b or from blocks f and g in the case of UMAE. The scenario independence check (block h) needs 
to verify that the transient type does not affect calculated uncertainties in each hypercube. For 
instance, it might happen that data from the analysis of several SBLOCA produce uncertainty 
values much higher than data from the analysis of a similar number of LBLOCA, when the same 
hypercubes are concerned. In this case, the outlet “NO” from the block h brings into the block i. 
The number of hypercubes, i.e. the ranges of variation of the driving quantities, must be changed 
or the transient type must be identified inside each hypercube. If the scenario independence 
check is positively passed, uncertainty values can be meaningfully assigned to each plant status. 
The already mentioned QUM and TUV are generated. 
3.2.2 CIAU application 
The application of the CIAU is straightforward once QUM and TUV are available. The error 
matrices and the error vector are currently used as a post-processor of a CIAU calculation. The 
ASM (Analytical Simulation Model), i.e. a qualified NPP nodalization in the UMAE 
nomenclature, is used to get the transient scenario. Once a generic event is predicted, block p, the 
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six driving quantities are used to identify the succession of hypercubes. The time intervals are 
also identified by the predicted event time, block r. This leads to the quantity uncertainty and the 
time uncertainty values, blocks s and t, respectively, that can be combined to get the searched 
uncertainty bands. It may be noted again that uncertainty bands only envelope the quantities 
selected under block e. The computer tool UBEP is used to combine time and quantity 
uncertainty at each time of the predicted event, block u. Continuous uncertainty bands are 
generated and envelope the ASM calculation results. 
3.2.3 CIAU status: RELAP5 
Until now the development of CIAU procedure was limited to the application of RELAP5 code. 
A huge activity, including Master and Ph.D. theses, were devoted to the development of the 
procedure and of the database. The efforts of M. Ingegneri, W. Giannotti, A. Pigentini, A. 
Petruzzi are the most relevant in chronological order (see Refs. /27/, /29/, /30/ and /31/). 
Moreover many others contributes to the development of the database in the framework of their 
activities including the author of the present thesis, preparing ITF nodalization and performing 
post tests analyses with RELAP5 code. Within the frame of the development of the CIAU for 
RELAP5 code, four QUM and four TUV have been developed, see Ref. /30/. These are 
characterized in Tab. 7, where also the objective for each set of QUM+TUV is also given. The 
first set, or couple QUM+TUV, constitutes the objective of the derivation of the CIAU. Any 
calculation used in the process and the correspondent experimental database is qualified in the 
sense required by UMAE. The second set has been considered in order to enlarge the database 
that can be derived through the UMAE. Gathering the data from the literature implies the 
following: 
 
1. The nodalizations may not be qualified; 
2. The user choices can be different from the standard ones required in the UMAE process; 
therefore, the user effect is more and more part of the uncertainty value; 
3. The experimental data may not be qualified; 
4. No acceptability condition is fulfilled in the comparison between measured and predicted 
trends; 
5. The number of data points originating QUM and TUV can be substantially larger than in 
the previous case (advantage of the set QUM+TUV N° 2). 
 
The third set of QUM+TUV has been created to test the numerical tools part of the CIAU, to 
prove the feasibility of the method and to show its capabilities. The uncertainty values have been 
arbitrarily assigned inside each hypercube and in relation to each time interval. The fourth set 
has been generated considering the wide experience gained and the resulting wide database from 
the application of RELAP5/MOD2 to SBLOCA analyses, Ref. /62/. The objective is to apply 
uncertainty results derived by UMAE and related to RELAP5/MOD2 code to calculations 
performed by RELAP5/MOD2 code. The application field is restricted to SBLOCA in PWR. 
The availability of the QUM+TUV set N° 4 allows a further qualification of the set N° 1. 
 
No Set of QUM and TUV Objective Reference Database 
1 CIAU goal CIAU UMAE qualified 
2 CIAU extended Code user effect & Widening the data base 
UMAE qualified and available 
from the literature 
3 CIAU test Proving capabilities and flexibility of the method Arbitrary data 
4 CIAU R5/M2 Exploit the available data base & constitute a reference 
RELAP5/mod2 SBLOCA 
related 
Tab. 7.   Couples of QUMs and TUVs developed in the frame of CIAU. 
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3.3 CIAU qualification processes 
One important aspect of any tool developed in system thermal-hydraulics is the possibility to 
perform the assessment and, eventually to show the quality level, utilizing databases independent 
from those utilized in the development of the tool itself. Three qualification steps are foreseen in 
the case of CIAU. 
 
The first one can be identified as internal qualification process. Data gathered inside each 
hypercube or each time interval of QUM and TUV, or inside QAM and TAV if the UMAE 
methodology is adopted, are labeled before being combined. In other terms, each uncertainty or 
accuracy connected value includes its origin, i.e. the transient scenario type and the part of the 
hypercube that is concerned. A statistical analysis can be used to find whether groups of data 
coming from different events or related to different parts of the same hypercube, are different. If 
this occurs, different matrices of hypercubes must be built up separating the event types, and/or 
the dimensions of hypercubes in the phase-space must be decreased.  
 
This process is continuously ongoing during the development of the method: the experience 
gained so far does not bring to any need to increase the number of hypercubes nor to characterize 
the event type. 
 
The second qualification step is carried out when a reasonable number of hypercubes and time 
intervals have been filled. In this case, the CIAU is run to simulate qualified transients measured 
in ITF (Integral Test Facilities) that have not been utilized for getting uncertainty values. The 
success is the demonstration that CIAU calculated uncertainty bands envelop the experimental 
data. This must be intended as the reference (external) qualification process for the CIAU, 
together with the condition that uncertainty bands are reasonably large. The completion of this 
step will also allow establishing, on an objective basis, the confidence level of the uncertainty 
statements. 
 
The increase in the number of positively completed qualification analyses will increase the 
confidence level of the procedure. No correlation has been established yet between the number 
of qualification analyses and the expected confidence level of the uncertainty results, though the 
target is to achieve the 95% confidence level. 
3.4 The numerical tools used in CIAU procedure 
An overview of tools and of procedures adopted for the development of CIAU or necessary to 
run the methodology is given in Tab. 8. The relevant procedures foreseen in the development or 
application processes have been implemented in specific computer programs: the Accuracy 
Finalized to Extrapolation (AFE), the Data Analysis for Statistical Treatment (DAST) and the 
Uncertainty Bands Extrapolation Process (UBEP) are described below 
3.4.1 The AFE tool 
Before introducing the AFE computer tool, three definitions of accuracy utilized in the entire 
process are shortly recalled (see also section 3.1). In all cases, the accuracy is related to the 
comparison between measured and calculated time trends or quantities. 
 
The qualitative accuracy (definition No. 1 and related to items I, II and III in Tab. 3) starts from 
the visual observation of time trends. RTA are introduced and characterized by digital values. 
Calculated and measured corresponding digital values are compared among each other and 
qualitatively evaluated. The success of the logical process consists in showing a one-by-one 
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correspondence between RTA in the experiment and in the calculation. In addition, a reasonable 
agreement among the values of the relevant quantities must be the outcome of the calculation. A 
positive result from the qualitative evaluation process is necessary before going to the accuracy 
quantification. 
 
No Procedure Existence of 
software 
Adopted 
procedure Notes 
(8)
 
1 Selection of NPP No ---(1) D & A 
2 Selection of the reference NPP transient No ---(2) D & A 
3 NPP & ITF nodalizations development No as in UMAE D & A 
4 NPP & ITF nodalization qualification at the ‘steady state’ level  Y (3) as in UMAE D & A 
5 NPP & ITF nodalization qualification at the ‘on-transient’ level Y (FFTBM)(4) as in UMAE D & A 
6 Derivation of Accuracy data finalized to the extrapolation Y (AFE)(5) CIAU specific D 
7 Use of the statistical method  Y (DAST)(5) CIAU specific D 
8 Use of the ASM and achievement of reference NPP calculation  No(6) --- A 
9 Derivation of continuous uncertainty bands Y (UBEP) CIAU specific A 
10 Introduction of biases if necessary No as in UMAE A 
11 Interpretation of uncertainty results No ---(7) --- 
(1) Must be consistent with the data base 
(2) As above. This could come from Probabilistic Safety Assessment study  
(3) A tab. of threshold values is available  
(4) Including the demonstration of similarity foreseen by UMAE process. This also implies the possible stop of the CIAU process. 
(5) Only in the phase of development. This procedure is not used for running of CIAU 
(6) Any recommendations of the manual should be considered. Qualification as in the UMAE 
(7) This activity is connected with follow-up and implications of CIAU results 
(8) D = Development of CIAU, A= Application of CIAU 
Tab. 8.   List of procedures and computer tools necessary to develop and to run the CIAU. 
The quantification of the accuracy is finalized to the acceptability of any set of computer code 
calculated results (definition No. 2 and related to item IV in Tab. 3). In this case, the FFTBM 
(Fast Fourier Transform Based Method, see also Ref. /14/) is utilized. This implies the 
transformation into the frequency domain of the measured and predicted time trends of 
significant variables. Acceptability thresholds are introduced that must be satisfied before any 
use of the above-mentioned database is made in the UMAE or in the CIAU processes. 
 
The accuracy of a generic calculation can be quantified for the use in the extrapolation process 
(definition No. 3 and related to item V in Tab. 3): this is the AFE tool. The quantity (see also 
Fig. 14): 
 
i,ji,j CE
Y
i,j Y/Y1A −=  Eq. 4 
 
)i(t/)i(t1A CEt i,j −=  Eq. 5 
 
is considered in the AFE process, where ))i(t(YY EjEE i,j =  and ))i(t(YY CjCC i,j =  are the values of 
a generic experimental and calculated thermal-hydraulic quantity at time tE(i) and tC(i) 
respectively for the test “j”. Therefore, Quantity Accuracy (QA) and accuracy in predicting 
timing into the transient, Time Accuracy (TA), are derived and stored in hypercubes (Hyp(Q)) 
and time cell (tcell) identified by the experimental (driving quantities) values QE,i and tE,i 
respectively: 
 
Y
i,j
)Q(Hyp
i,j AA =  
t
i,j
tcell
i,j AA =  
Eq. 6 
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QA and TA are evaluated in relation to any time interval, separately taken in the measured and 
the calculated data sets. 
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Fig. 14.   Derivation of the time error ∆t(i) and of the quantity error ∆Y(i). 
The list of occurrences given in Tab. 9 is utilized to characterize the time spans in the 
experimental and calculated databases. Any experimental database in relevant ITF or SETF 
combined with a code simulation can be used to originate QA and TA for the corresponding 
hypercube and time interval. Any thermalhydraulic quantity calculated by the code and measured 
in the experiments is eligible for being considered for uncertainty evaluation into a hypercube. 
 
Test Start 
Scram 
Main Steam Line valve operation (closure, opening) 
Main Feed Water operation (closure, opening) 
Pump trip and coastdown limits 
Blowdown in saturation condition 
Pressurizer PORV actuation (start and end of cycling) 
Steam generators Steam Relief valve operation (start and end of cycling) 
ECCS (accumulators, Low Pressure Injection System, High Pressure Injection System) start and end of liquid 
delivery 
Dryout occurrence (at two-thirds of the active fuel height) 
Rewetting occurrence (at two-thirds of the active fuel height) 
Actuation of relevant Engineered Safety Features (Pressurizer heaters, Chemical and Volume Control System, 
residual Heat Removal, etc.) 
Neutron power peaks in case of Anticipated Transient without Scram 
Tab. 9.   List of time events utilized for identifying comparable time spans in the experimental 
and calculated databases (input to the AFE computer tool). 
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The upper plenum pressure, the rod surface temperature at 2/3 of core height and the mass 
inventory in the primary loop have been chosen for filling the QUM. Transient time is necessary 
for filling the TUV. Although the variables selected for the QA coincide with three of the six 
driving quantities, this does not constitute a condition for the process. Assuming available 
experimental and calculated databases that fulfil the UMAE conditions5, the AFE tools 
completes the following steps: 
 
1. derivation of time spans on the basis of the occurrence of events listed in Tab. 9. Time 
spans generally have different duration in the experimental and in the calculated 
scenarios. 
2. Derivation of the time succession of hypercubes (based on experimental driving 
quantities): each time span may belong to one or more hypercubes and to one or more 
time intervals. 
3. Calculation of QA and TA from the Hypi,jA  definition, inside each hypercube and time 
interval, respectively. In the case of QA, values at different times are considered; 
therefore, an average value Aj and a standard deviation σj are obtained in each hypercube 
for each test “j”: 
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Eq. 7 
 
where Mj is the number of points of the test “j” that fall in the same hypercube (Hyp). The value 
of Mj is arbitrary in each experiment. However, a minimum value for Mj is recommended: Mj 
must be >10 in each hypercube or time interval. 
 
Quantity Accuracy Matrix (QAM) and a vector named Time Accuracy Vector (TAV). Fig. 15 
illustrates the filling process of the database. The transient time tE,i and the values of the six 
driving quantities QE,i at time tE,i allow identifying the time cell (i) inside TAV and the 
hypercube (Q1; …; Q6) inside QAM, where the time and the quantity accuracy values will be 
stored respectively. 
 
The six digits (one for each driving quantities) identify each hypercube: each digit is related to 
one of the quantities (a) to (f) listed in Tab. 5: the first digit deals with the primary pressure (in 
upper plenum or pressurizer), the second one with the mass inventory and so on. The value of the 
digit characterizes the interval. For instance considering the hypercube 833311 (see Tab. 5): 
 
• the first digit 8 is the primary pressure range between 10 and 15 MPa, 
• the second (3) is the primary mass inventory in the range between 80 and 100% of the 
initial nominal value, 
• the third (3) is the steam generator pressure in the range between 7 -9 MPa, 
• the fourth (2) is the cladding temperature in the range of 573-643K, 
• the fifth (1) is related the core power betweem 0.5 and 1% of the initial nominal value,  
                                                 
5
 The experimental database must be originated by a qualified ITF and by qualified boundary and initial conditions. The scaling problem must be 
addressed. Measured data should be acceptable, too. The calculated database must be achieved by a qualified/frozen code version, adopting a 
qualified nodalization developed following specified rules. The comparison between experimental and calculated data must demonstrate the 
fulfilment of the qualitative and quantitative accuracy criteria. These imply the use of the FFTBM tool. 
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• the sixth (1) is the SG downcomer level in percent of the initial nominal value in the range 
between 0and 50%. 
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(Q1; Q2; Q3; Q4; Q5; Q6) ?   Hypercube inside QAM 
 
Qd : Experimental Driving Quantity d (d = 1…6) 
 
Qd (pd) : Interval pd (pd = 1...nd) of the Driving Quantity Qd 
 
nd : Max interval number for the coordinate Qd 
 
AYk : Quantity Accuracy Value for the Object Quantity k 
 
At : Time Accuracy Value 
 
i : Time cell number (i = 1…N) inside TAV 
 
N : Total number of time cells 
 
ti : Experimental Transient time corresponding to time cell 
 number i 
 
Fig. 15.   Structures of QAM and TAV. QUM and TUV have a similar structure but they 
contain uncertainty values instead of accuracy values. 
Considering a generic hypercube (with its label as above described) filled with accuracy data 
coming from experiments and calculations, the following information are explicitly given: 
 
• first column: a “4 digits” label that is the reference experiment ID (chosen by the database 
developer); 
• second and third columns: the average accuracy ( )Q(HYPjA )and the accuracy dispersion 
originated from the comparison between experimental and calculated data concerned with 
pressure inside that hypercube; 
• fourth and fifth columns: the average accuracy ( )Q(HYPjA ) and the accuracy dispersion 
originated from the comparison between experimental and calculated data concerned with 
primary system mass inventory inside that hypercube, 
• sixth and seventh columns: the average accuracy ( )Q(HYPjA ) and the accuracy dispersion 
originated from the comparison between experimental and calculated data concerned with 
rod surface temperature inside that hypercube. 
 
From the structure of the database, and before processing the data to obtain the QUM and TUV 
by DAST tool (see following section), the CIAU developers has the possibility to recognize the 
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sources of error, by connecting the error itself with the experiment. For instance, it will be 
possible to distinguish, inside each hypercube, errors coming from SBLOCA from errors coming 
from LBLOCA. This process is relevant for performing the “internal qualification” of the CIAU. 
It is also clear that the analysis of new experiments allows increasing the number of data inside 
each hypercube and a better statistical basis for the final step of data treatment. 
 
The TAV is divided as in Tab. 6. Each time interval is identified by a label in increasing order 
starting form 1 that correspond to the time interval from 0s to 1s. 
 
Each time interval has two columns: 
 
• the first contains a “4 digits” label that is the reference experiment ID (the same of the first 
column of the QAM); 
• the second gives the error in % of the time value that characterizes the center of the 
assigned time interval: a unique error (time accuracy) is calculated from each experiment 
inside each time interval. 
 
It can be easily understood that the number of data in the time intervals decreases with the 
increasing of time. 
3.4.2 The DAST tool 
The results from AFE are available in hypercubes and time intervals. These are related to 
different facilities and different test types, each of these being identified. Once a suitable number 
of data points are gathered in each hypercube or time interval, DAST performs the statistical 
evaluation, utilizing the theoretical background and the derivation outlined in this paragraph. No 
restriction has been put to the number of data points: tentatively, at least ten data points derived 
from at least three differently scaled facilities must be available in each hypercube to make 
reliable the statistical evaluation. 
 
Through the accuracy extrapolation process inside each NPP status, several accuracy values are 
transformed into one uncertainty value per each hypercube (quantity uncertainty, uQ) and per 
each time interval (time uncertainty, ut). The following formula is adopted per each “object” 
quantity: 
 
( ) YEEEAU SV ⋅+++= σ  Eq. 8 
 
where: 
 
U = one side of the uncertainty band width for the “object” quantity Y, 
A = extrapolated accuracy inside the hypercube, 
E = extra errors coming from sources detailed below, 
Y = reference (“object”) value calculated by the code. 
 
The term into parentheses constitutes the non-dimensional percent uncertainty and is directly 
available into QUM and TUV. In the above equation, EV, ES and Eσ are extra contributions to the 
error originated by the dimensions of the facility, and the dispersion of accuracy inside each 
hypercube or time interval coming from a single experiment and from the combination of 
experiments, respectively. The term ES is originated by the presence of several accuracy data in 
each hypercube due to the same experiment. This term is zero in each time interval. In deriving 
the global accuracy A=AHyp(Q), weighting factors have been used: 
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1. to account for scaling distortions of each facility (data coming from NPP measurements 
are given a weight equal to one); 
2. to account for measurement errors; 
3. to account for data dispersion originated by the accuracy averaging process in each 
hypercube or time interval (outputs of the AFE). 
 
The following formulas are adopted: 
 
∑
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where j varies between 1 and N, where N is the number of experiments (and connected code 
calculations) inside each hypercube Hyp(Q)or time interval tcell. The value of N is arbitrary, but 
it is recommended that at least three experiments coming from three different facilities (with 
different scaling factor) belong to the selected hypercube or time cell. The weighting factor Pj 
(for each hypercube or time cell) is given by: 
 
∑
=
⋅⋅
⋅⋅
= N
1j
SjKjDj
SjKjDj
j
PPP
PPP
P  Eq. 11 
 
In Eq. 11, each weighting factor may assume a value between 0 and 1. In addition: 
 
1. PDj is the weighting factor that accounts for the intrinsic error affecting any data. 
Experimental errors or lack of experimental characterization are part of this. For instance, 
if the dry out occurrence is not the same in any point of a core cross section plane, the rod 
temperature value is given a weighting factor equal to 0.1. 
 
2. PSj: is the weighting factor that accounts for the dispersion of An. In particular, PSj = 1 to 
0.9 Sj if 0 < Sj <100%, and PSj = 0.1 if Sj > 100%, where Sj is twice the fractional 
standard deviation of the distribution of the An. PSj = 1 in the case of time intervals. In 
particular: 
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where )Q(HypjA are the single data points in Eq. 7. 
 
3. PKj is the weighting factor that accounts for geometrical distortions that characterize 
scaled facilities: 
 
V
4
Kj K
10571.0P
−
⋅−=           if          Kv>20 Eq. 15 
 
and PKj = 1, if Kv < 20 or in the cases when NPPs are involved. In these last equations, Kv is the 
actual volume-scaling factor of the facilities (i.e., all the scaling factors are related to the 
reference reactor of the largest facility). 
 
4. Ev takes into account the average volume of the facilities that are used to generate the 
database. This is written as a function of the average Kv that characterizes the database 
inside each hypercube or time interval: 
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5. Es takes into account the average spread of accuracy data in each hypercube and is given 
as a function of the Si. This error is originated by the dimensions of the hypercube and is 
defined as: 
 
∑
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N
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jjS S2PE  Eq. 18 
 
In particular, Es is defined inside hypercubes and not for time intervals (i.e., this error equals zero 
in the case of time intervals). 
 
6. Eσ accounts for the dispersion inside each hypercube or time interval. This is originated 
by the combination of database (i.e. experiment and connected code calculation) of 
different origins. This is taken equal to 2σ, where σ is defined inside each hypercube or 
time interval: 
 
σσ ⋅= 2E  Eq. 19 
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The weights constitute engineering judgment that is part of the development process of the 
CIAU (and of the UMAE) that must not be exercised during the application of the methodology. 
The impact of the selected values of the weighting factors upon the predicted uncertainty results 
has been evaluated: different sets of reasonable weighting factors do not bring substantial 
changes in the uncertainty bands. 
 
It may be noted that the considered formulation deals with the process of data combination and 
of uncertainty identification. In relation to the first process, the weighting factors are used to 
lower or to increase the importance of a single datum depending upon the error or the accuracy 
that characterizes this datum. 
 
In the second process, weighting factors are used to increase the final uncertainty depending 
upon the overall error that characterizes the database. The values of ES and of Eσ and their 
distribution, once the process of filling of the hypercubes and the time intervals is completed, 
make evident the possible need of reducing the dimensions of hypercubes or of considering 
separately the data from different types of experiments. 
 
The demonstration that the quality of code predictions is not affected by the dimension of the 
considered facility or that the code is applicable for NPP studies constitutes the scaling problem. 
This is not directly dealt with in the DAST computer tool. However, the research that brought to 
the formulation of the UMAE and to the introduction of the NPP statuses supports the current 
approach. The internal qualification process must be completed in order to guarantee 
(reasonably) the scaling capability of the gathered database. 
 
In the adopted nomenclature, the error is the difference |YE – YC|. In the case of TUV, the 
average error in the ith time interval (time interval i) is not smaller than the average error in the 
time interval i–1. If DAST calculates a smaller error, the average error of the ith time interval is 
set to the value of the time interval i–1. 
 
The confidence in the uncertainty results, i.e., in the wideness of the error bands bounding the 
code-calculated time trends, is connected with the terms EV, ES, and Eσ defined earlier. The 
generic objective is to get a 95% confidence bound, consistent with the demand from the current 
risk-based regulation.  
 
The results of the DAST constitute the QUM and TUV. 
3.4.3 The UBEP tool 
The UBEP is the actual post-processor of the CIAU methodology. Uncertainty bands are 
superimposed to time trends representative of the selected Nuclear Power Plant transient 
scenario. This is calculated by the Analytical Simulation Model. 
 
The six driving quantities output of the ASM are firstly used to identify the sequences of 
hypercubes and the time intervals that characterize the selected NPP transient scenario. So, time 
and quantity uncertainties are known at each time into the transient. A rectangle can be built up 
per each transient time, as sketched in Fig. 12c. This is related to one of the three selected object 
quantities for uncertainty evaluation. The last operation of the UBEP consists in finding the 
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envelope of all the rectangles (Fig. 12d). In this way, continuous upper and lower uncertainty 
bands are generated in relation to upper plenum pressure, rod cladding temperature at 2/3 core 
height and fluid mass inventory of the primary loop. 
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4 DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACCURACY DATABASE 
APPLICABLE TO CATHARE2 CODE 
The objective of the CIAU, as already stated, is the derivation of uncertainty bands bounding 
time varying results representative of transient scenarios in LWR. This is the outcome of the 
application of a qualified system thermal-hydraulic code, in this case CATHARE2 and a 
uncertainty method (UMAE). This chapter provides a brief overview of the selected code 
(section 4.1), used at UNIPI since 1986, and of the activity performed for creating the database 
of tests (section 4.2). 
4.1 CATHARE2 code 
The development of the CATHARE2 (Code for Analysis of Thermal-hydraulics during an 
Accident of Reactor and safety Evaluation) code was initiated in 1979 /64/. It is a joint effort of 
CEA, IRSN, EDF and FRAMATOME-ANP. The objectives of the code are: 
 
• perform safety analyses with best estimate calculations of thermal-hydraulic transients in 
Pressurized Water Reactors for postulated accidents or other incidents, such as LBLOCA, 
SBLOCA, SGTR, Loss of RHR, Secondary breaks, Loss of Feed-Water; 
• quantify the conservative analyses margin; 
• investigate Plant Operating and Accident Management Procedures; 
• be used as a plant analyzer, in a full scope training simulator providing real time 
calculation. 
 
Its applications are limited to transients during which no severe damage occurs to fuel rods. 
The code is based on a 2-fluid 6-equation model. The presence of non condensable gases (such 
as nitrogen, hydrogen, air and argon /65/) can be modeled by one to four additive transport 
equations. A non-volatile component (as boron) and activity can be treated by the code. The code 
is able to model any kind of experimental facility or PWR (western type and VVER /66/), and is 
usable for other reactors (fusion reactors, RBMK reactors, BWR reactors and research reactors). 
CATHARE2-V2.5 has also new operator suitable for gas reactors (High Temperature Reactor 
"HTR", Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor "GT MHR", etc.) capable to model gas turbine or 
compressor and for containment building modeling with new object addressed to the interaction 
between primary circuit and containment building and to the containment condensation 
modeling. Moreover new low pressure water properties are allowed by the activation of a special 
directive. 
 
The code is used for research, safety and design purposes by French institutions (i.e. CEA, EDF, 
and IRSN) and it has been released also abroad in other institutes, i.e. University of Pisa. The 
applications mainly concern plant system and component designs, the definition and verification 
of emergency operating procedures, investigations for new types of core management, new 
reactors and system designs, the preparation and interpretation of experimental programs. For 
safety analysis, a methodology has been developed in order to evaluate uncertainties on the code 
predictions. 
 
CATHARE2 has a modular structure. Several modules can be assembled to represent the 
primary and secondary circuits of any reactor and of any separate-effect or integral test facility. 
The modules are: 
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• the 1-D module to describe pipe flow, 
• the 1-D module with tee used to represent a main pipe (1-D module) with a lateral branch 
(tee-branch). The T module predicts phase separation phenomena, and a specific 
modeling effort has been paid for cases where the flow is stratified in the main pipe, 
• the volume module, a two-node module used to describe large size plena with several 
connections, such as the pressurizer, the accumulator, the steam generator dome or the 
lower plenum and upper plenum of a PWR. The volume predicts level swell, total or 
partial fluid stratification and phase separation phenomena at the junctions, 
• the 3-D module to describe multidimensional effects in the vessel. 
 
To complete the modeling of the circuits, sub-modules can be connected to the main modules: 
 
• the CCFL module which may be connected at any junctions, or at any vector node of the 1-
D module, in order to predict the counter current flow limitation in complex geometries 
such as the upper core plate and the inlet of SG tubes, 
• the multi-layer wall module in which radial conduction is calculated, 
• the reflooding model with 2-D heat conduction in the wall or fuel rod for predicting 
quench front progression: both bottom up quenching and top-down quenching can be 
predicted, 
• the fuel pin thermo-mechanics sub-module, which can predict fuel cladding deformation, 
creep, rupture, clad oxidation and thermal exchanges, 
• heat exchangers between two circuits or between two elements of a circuit, 
• the point neutronics module (a 3-D neutronics code can also be coupled to CATHARE2), 
• the accumulator sub-module, 
• sources and sinks, breaks, SGTR, 
• 1-node pump, 
• pressurizer sub-module based on Volume module with specific features, 
• valves, safety valves, check valves, flow limiters, 
• boundary conditions. 
4.1.1 Physical description 
All modules use the 2-fluid model to describe steam-water flows and up to four non condensable 
gases may be transported. Both thermal and mechanical non-equilibrium of the two phases are 
described. All kinds of two-phase flow patterns are modeled. Only two transitions are explicitly 
written and used in several closure terms of CATHARE2: 
 
• the transition between stratified and no stratified flow, which depends on two criteria: a 
first criterion is based on Kelvin-Helmholtz instability threshold and the second depends 
on the relative effects of bubble sedimentation and of bubble turbulent mixing, 
• the transition between annular and droplets flows. 
 
These two transitions describe the passage from a separate flow to a dispersed flow. Co-current 
and counter-current flows are modeled with prediction of the Counter-Current Flow Limitation. 
 
Heat transfer with wall structures and with fuel rods is calculated taking into account all heat 
transfer processes: 
 
• natural and forced convection with liquid in both laminar and turbulent regimes, 
• natural and forced convection with gas in both laminar and turbulent regimes, 
University of Pisa - DIMNP - 69 - Section 4 
 Ph. D. Thesis in Nuclear Safety - XIX Cycle 
Alessandro Del Nevo - January 2007 - Page 69 of 258 
• sub-cooled and saturated nucleate boiling with criteria for onset of nucleate boiling and net 
vapor generation, 
• critical heat flux, dry-out criterion, rewetting temperature and transition boiling, 
• film boiling for inverted annular, inverted-slug and dispersed flows, 
• film condensation and effect of non-condensable gases, 
• radiation to vapor and to liquid, 
• enhancement model downstream a quench front. 
 
The interfacial heat and mass transfers describe not only the vaporization due to superheated 
steam and the direct condensation due to sub-cooled liquid, but also the steam condensation or 
liquid flashing due to metastable sub-cooled steam or superheated liquid. The range of 
parameters is rather large: pressure from 0.1 to 25 MPa, gas temperature from 20°C to 2000°C, 
fluid velocities up to supersonic conditions, duct hydraulic diameter from 0.01 to 0.75m. 
4.1.2 System of equations 
Mass, momentum, and energy equations are established for any CATHARE2 module. They are 
written for each phase. They are derived from exact local instantaneous equations, using some 
simplifications through physical assumptions and using time and space averaging procedures. 
One up to four transport equations can be added when non condensable gases are present. 
 
Fluid scalar properties, like pressure, enthalpy, density and void fraction, are represented by 
average fluid conditions viewed as being located at the mesh center (scalar point). Fluid vector 
properties, like velocity, are located at vector points (point between two meshes in axial 
elements) or at junctions. 
4.1.3 Closure relations 
Closure relationships concern mass, momentum, and energy exchanges between phases and 
between each phase and the wall. 
 
• As far as possible, physical closure laws are developed on an experimental basis. Original 
correlations are developed when existing models are not satisfactory. 
• In the domain where experimental and theoretical knowledge is missing, extrapolations are 
adopted by making simple assumptions. 
• Thermal and mechanical transfers are interconnected. It is assumed in a first 
approximation. 
 
Those mechanical interactions do not strongly depend on thermal exchanges. Mechanical terms 
are first derived from experiments where thermal non equilibrium is negligible. Interfacial heat 
transfer terms are then derived. Finally wall to fluid heat fluxes are correlated. 
 
Each closure law is unique. No choice between several correlations is proposed to the users in 
order to reduce the user effect. 
4.1.4 Differential terms 
• Added mass term in momentum equations in order to better control the sonic velocity. 
• Interfacial pressure difference term in momentum equations in order to model level 
variation effects in stratified flows; this allows ensuring the hyperbolicity of the model. 
• Cross-section area variation term in momentum equations in order to model level effects 
in stratified flows in area reduction or enlargement. 
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4.1.5 Wall and interfacial transfers 
Many correlations were original; some of them are listed in the following: 
 
• The interfacial friction correlations for bubbly-slug-churn flows, 
• The wall friction. It is mainly derived from a modified Lockhart-Martinelli correlation. 
• The wall heat transfer for dry wall situation. Models parameters have been adjusted to fit 
reflooding data. 
• The flashing. The correlation is mainly empirical and derived from the analysis of critical 
flow tests. 
• The direct contact condensation at safety injection. A semi-empirical correlation 
accounting the local effects of the Injection jet has been developed. 
• The non condensable gas effect. The modeling of mass diffusion effects is based on a 
classical heat and mass transfer analogy. An original procedure was developed in order to 
avoid the calculation of the interface temperature. 
 
The numerical method in the CATHARE2 code uses a first order finite volume -finite difference 
scheme with a staggered mesh and the donor cell principle. Mass and energy equations use a 
conservative form and are discretized in order to keep a very good mass and energy 
conservation. The wall conduction is implicitly coupled to hydraulic calculations. 
4.1.6 Solution procedure 
A fully implicit numerical scheme was adopted in order to use-time steps as long as possible. 
The non linear system of equations is solved by a Newton-Raphson iterative method following 
several steps. At each iteration: 
 
• increments of internal variables of each element are eliminated as function of increments 
of junction variables. 
• increments of all junction variables are calculated. 
 
All variable increments are regenerated and convergence tests are performed. 
4.2 The database of tests 
The application of the CIAU procedure is conditioned by large effort necessary for having a 
suitable documented database of experiments and calculations. The database must to include 
tests in which the experiments and the calculated results satisfy the acceptability criteria 
envisaged in the UMAE methodology (for detail see Refs. /11/, /3/ and /13/).  
 
A large amount of resources (in terms of manpower and computational tools utilized) of the 
present work has been devoted to the achievement and the overcoming of the minimum number 
of tests considered acceptable for preparing the first CIAU database (the target was 20 tests 
derived by the experience gained in the development of the first RELAP5 database/30/). The 
framework, in which the activity has been performed, is summarized in section 1.1. 
 
The database includes 25 tests6 performed in different relevant ITFs (see Appendix A) here 
below outlined. 
 
                                                 
6
 two of them, the fifteenth is not qualified, and the twenty-fifth has not been carried out nor following the UMAE 
method neither applying the method “a posteriori”. 
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• PSB-VVER facility is a VVER1000 (V-320 design) NPP simulator. It is full high ITF 
(elevations scaled 1:1) at “low-power” with volume, and cross-sectional area scaled down 
1:300. The facility has the primary and secondary systems at full pressure as in the 
reference NPP.  
• PKL-III facility is KONVOI 1300-MWe PWR NPP simulator (Siemens design). It is a full 
height ITF (elevation scaled 1:1) that models the entire primary system and most of the 
secondary systems (except turbine and condenser). The power, volume and cross 
sectional areas are scaled down 1:145. The primary and secondary side pressures are 
scaled with respect to the reference NPP and cannot exceed about 5MPa and 5.6MPa 
respectively. All four loops are simulated separately.  
• LOBI/Mod2 facility is simulator of a 1300-MWe KWU-PWR Siemens (4 loops). It is a 
full-power, full-pressure ITF scaled down 1:712. It incorporates the essential features of a 
typical PWR primary and secondary cooling system. 
• BETHSY facility is a 900MWe FRA-PWR (3 loops) simulator. It is full high ITF 
(elevations scaled 1:1) full pressure at “low power” with volume and cross-sectional area 
scaled down 1:100. BETHSY is equipped with all circuits and systems which are likely to 
play a role during an accident transient. One relevant objective of the BETHSY 
programme was to assess and validate CATHARE2 safety computer code. 
• LOFT (Loss-Of-Fluid-Test) facility is a 1000MWe Westinghouse PWR NPP (4 loops) 
simulator. It is a fully operational PWR able to investigate the nuclear thermal and 
hydraulic phenomena. The coolant volumes and flow areas in LOFT were scaled using 
the ratio of the LOFT core that is 50 MWth. 
 
Tab. 10 highlights some peculiarities of the ITFs used for performing the experiments used for 
the preparation of the database. 
 
# Quantity Unit PSB-VVER PKL-III LOBI/Mod2 BETHSY LOFT 
1 Reference reactor type -- VVER-1000 (4 loops) 
KWU-PWR 
Siemens 
(4 loops) 
KWU-PWR 
Siemens 
(4 loops) 
FRA-PWR 
(3 loops) 
W-PWR 
(4 loops) 
2 Reference reactor power MWth 3000 3900 3900 2775 3000 
3 ITF nominal power MWth 1.5* 2.512 5.28 2.86 10 
4 ITF number of loops -- 4 4 2 3 4 
5 ITF number of rods -- 168 340 8x8 428 1300 
6 Nominal pressure primary side MPa 15.7 4.5 *** 15.7 15.5 15.5 
7 Maximum secondary side pressure Mpa 5.9 5.6 *** 6.94 6.80 5.86 
8 ITF volume with PRZ m3 -- 3.282 ** 0.649 2.86 -- 
9 Number of tubes for SG -- 34 28 il 24 bl 8 34 -- 
10 Internal diameter of SG tubes mm  19.6 il 19.6 bl 19.6 19.68 -- 
11 L/D ratio of hot leg – max and 
min values --  32.18 
il 60.814 
bl 95.010 38.04 -- 
* Full power (10MW) will be available in 2007. 
** Ref. /67/. 
*** Limit on the operator pressure. 
Tab. 10.   Main peculiarities of the ITF. 
Different types of transient scenarios are included in the database. These are listed in Tab. 11, 
where the types of experiment are grouped following the same logic used when the database is 
prepared in the CIAU procedure. They are: 
 
• 15 Small Break LOCA; 
• 1 Large Break LOCA; 
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• 4 LOFW; 
• 2 MSLB; 
• 2 SGTR; 
• 1 PORV stuck open. 
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PSB-VVER 7*and** 0 4 *** 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 
PKL-III 3 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LOBI/Mod2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BETHSY 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LOFT 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 15 1 4 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 
* 1 test is NC experiments 
** 1 test is an Intermediate Break LOCA 
*** 1 test is a Station Blackout 
Tab. 11.   The database: types of experiments executed in different facilities. 
As discussed in section 1.1, the database of experiment-calculations derives form several 
activities: some aimed at the CATHARE2 assessment and validation (collaborations with CEA 
and EDF), some others regarding the demonstration of availability of qualified computational 
tools in order to use these for developing AM procedures in VVER-1000 NPP (TACIS 30303), 
others from the participations to international activities (OECD PSB-VVER and OECD SETH 
and PKL III) and finally one, the LOFT L2-5 LBLOCA, provided directly by CEA (F). This is 
the only test of the database with an incomplete documentation available at UNIPI: the input 
deck is not available and the complete set of results has not fully provided. 
 
Notwithstanding a complete documentation is available for each of the tests included in the 
database (Refs. from 16 to 30) a suitable and relevant procedure for archiving, classifying and 
verifying the tests of the database has been set up and reported in Ref. 9. The aim is: 
• to allow an easy check of all database tests and of their implementation in the CIAU 
procedure; 
• to record in systematic way all relevant information characterizing the database and its 
implementation (the relevant documents, the input decks, the experimental data, the 
identification of the used parameters, etc...); 
• to provide the possibility to easily transfer the “know how” gained in the development 
phase to any other developer (or user); 
• to make easier a quick verification of all data embedded in QUM and TUV; 
• to support the application of the database (through UBEP program) with all the necessary 
information regarding the data used. 
 
Notwithstanding a complete documentation is available for each test included in the database 
(Refs. /13/, /35/, /38/, /39/ and from /68/ to /78/), a suitable and relevant procedure for archiving, 
classifying and verifying the tests of the database has been set up and reported in Appendix A. 
The aim is: 
 
• to allow an easy check of all database tests and of their implementation in the CIAU 
procedure; 
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• to record in systematic way all relevant information characterizing the database and its 
implementation (the relevant documents, the input decks, the experimental data, the 
identification of the used parameters, etc...); 
• to provide the possibility to easily transfer the “know how” gained in the development 
phase to any other developer (or user); 
• to make easier a quick verification of all data embedded in QUM and TUV; 
• to support the application of the database (through UBEP program) with all the necessary 
information regarding the data used. 
 
Going into details, the Appendix A is divided into two sections: the first deals with the relevant 
information necessary for the database from a general point of view; the second part is related to 
the data (parameters trends) that are part of the database, how they are treated by CIAU 
“development”7 the results of each test obtained running the AFE and DAST programs. 
 
The first section in Appendix A contains four generic tables summarized hereafter. 
 
• The first table provides relevant information about the experiment. 
o The facilities involved. 
o The Kv of the ITFs. 
o The identification label of the experiment. 
o The type of transients. 
o The document, possibly the experimental data report and/or the test analysis report or 
an equivalent document, prepared by the owner of the facility. All these documents 
have been archived with a label “XXX_EXP_YYYY”, where XXX is the ordered 
number of the first column of each table and the last is the ID label of the CIAU 
database (a four digits number). 
o The Project in which the experiment has been carried out or at least used for the 
CATHARE2 analysis. 
• The second table is related to the experimental and calculated data. 
o The first two columns are relevant for identifying the same test in these general tables, 
reporting a progressive number and the “official” identification of the experiment. 
o The third, fourth and fifth columns give information about the “label” of the files 
archived in which the experimental data, the nodalizations and the calculated data are 
contained. It should be noted that some of them are the complete set of experimental 
data recorded during the execution of the test in the “original” ACSII format, some 
others are modified and converted in “binary” format suitable for WINGRAF 
program and containing only the parameters used for the analysis. 
o Then the last two columns report the version of the code used and the reference 
where the post test analysis is documented. 
• The third table provides information related to the level of qualification of the tests of the 
database (with reference to UMAE method). It is relevant because the application of the 
CIAU procedure requires a large amount of data inside the hypercubes, and moreover a 
large number of different tests necessary for filling all relevant hypercubes. For this 
reason it can be useful have the possibility to use code calculations performed by different 
users or institutions. These should be included in the database after that all the UMAE 
                                                 
7
 Given the peculiarities of the method the two phases of the CIAU procedure are also named CIAU “development” 
and CIAU “application”. The first is connected with the utilization of the AFE and DAST programs and the 
availability of the QUM and TUV, the second is related to the utilization of QUM and TUV in the application phase 
using UBEP program. 
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verifications are checked. Nevertheless it is not always possible because it requires the 
availability of the input deck and of all results. The table is structured as follows: 
o the first two columns are relevant for identifying the same test in these general tables, 
reporting a progressive number and the “official” identification of the experiment; 
o the columns from three to six are related to the UMAE methodologies steps (divided in 
steady state level qualification and “on transient level qualification”; 
o the last two columns give an idea about which method have been used for the post test 
analysis (i.e. UMAE) and the institution that performed the analysis. It must be 
stressed that it could happen that even if the post test analysis is carried out without 
any methodology that requires quantitative acceptance criteria (i.e. the threshold 
limits of the FFT-BM), the method have been verified “a posteriori”. 
• The last table is focused on the development phase of the CIAU procedure summarizing . 
o The first two columns are relevant for identifying the same test in these general tables, 
reporting a progressive number and the “official” identification of the experiment. 
o The third column is the identification label required by CIAU software. 
o The fourth and fifth provides some relevant data regarding the transient. 
o From the sixth to the last the number of hypercubes involved by the test, and the last 
time considered for filling the quantity matrix and the time vector. 
 
The second part of the Appendix A provides details about each test. Information is reported in 
two tables summarizing experimental and calculated parameter data and their implementation 
during development phase of CIAU procedure. The first table provides the main results by the 
application of the qualitative accuracy evaluation. The accuracy of the 6 parameters, used as 
driving quantities, is evaluated with the FFT-BM as well as the results of the accuracy used for 
the qualification of the nodalizations and the acceptability of the calculations (the primary 
pressure and the total). The labels of each parameter used in the development phase of the CIAU 
procedure are reported. The trends of calculated and experimental parameters are also plotted, 
and the agreement is judged from a qualitative point of view. 
 
The second table deals with the implementation of the test in the CIAU procedure. The 
phenomenological windows are identified. All flags envisaged in the input are underlined in the 
table as well as other relevant information in the column of notes. Finally the number of points 
recorded in the data files is also highlighted. 
 
The post processing of ach test is also reported providing information on: 
 
• uncertainty distribution inside the time intervals; 
• uncertainty distribution inside the hypercubes; 
• distribution of points inside the hypercubes; 
• primary pressure uncertainty distribution inside the hypercubes; 
• primary mass inventory uncertainty distribution inside the hypercubes; 
• fuel cladding temperature uncertainty distribution inside the hypercubes. 
 
Such documentation, of the tests available, is a valuable achievement of the present database and 
it constitutes a reference for the next Chapter 5, dealing with the significant results obtained 
during the CIAU development and main applications. 
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5 CATHARE2 DATABASE IMPLEMENTATION: CIAU 
PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT, QUALIFICATION AND 
APPLICATION 
The objective of CIAU is to derive the uncertainty bands bounding time varying results 
representative of transient scenarios in LWR. Within the frame of the development of the CIAU 
applicable to RELAP5 code, four sets of QUM and TUV were developed (just one of these, SET 
1, includes qualified tests), as stated in Ref. /30/. 
 
The present activity aimed at the development of the CIAU procedure applicable to CATHARE2 
code, was addressed with the objective to include in the database only qualified tests in the sense 
required by UMAE. Nevertheless, some comments are hereafter pointed out, on the tests and the 
code version, in order to clarify the hypotheses applied and some peculiarities of the database. 
 
• Different versions of the code are included in the database. It is assumed that more recent 
version of the code does not produce worse results with the same input deck (not 
regressive hypothesis)8.  
• Some tests included in the database do not fulfill all the requirements envisaged in the 
UMAE methodology (the threshold limits of the primary pressure in the FFT-BM 
applications for tests like station blackout or loss of feed water). Notwithstanding this 
they are included and considered as qualified. This issue has been discussed in Ref. /13/ 
and also briefly reported in Appendix B 
• One test, the twenty-fifth (the L2-5 LBLOCA performed in LOFT facility in the 
framework of BEMUSE Project), provided by CEA, has been included in the database 
notwithstanding it has not been analyzed using the UMAE requirements (Ref. /78/). It 
must be stressed that it is an update of the calculation previously performed in Ref. /81/, 
analyzed following the UMAE requirements. 
• One test, the fifteenth (the PRISE performed in PSB-VVER facility in the framework of 
the OECD PSB-VVER Project), is not qualified. 
• One test, the twelfth (the NC performed in PSB-VVER facility in the framework of the 
TACIS Project), carried out by EREC, has been included but any quantitative information 
on the nodalization is available. 
 
The database developed is labeled “SET1_C2_2007M00” and all tests included in the database 
are listed in Tab. 12. A general view of the database is furnished from Fig. 16 to Fig. 21. 
 
The abscissa from Fig. 18 to Fig. 21 is the sequential number of hypercubes that are reported 
from 1 to 8100 (i.e. the hypercube1 is the one identified “1 1 1 1 1 1” and the hypercube 8100 is 
identified “9 4 3 5 5 3” ”, where each number is the interval of the six driving quantities).  
 
Fig. 16 highlights the number of tests that contributes to the time uncertainty stored in TUV.  
Fig. 17 shows the time uncertainty (with 95% of probability) characterizing the time occurrence 
of any point during the transient (the connection between the time block and the physical time is 
also evident). The conclusion is that the method is applicable for transient not longer than 5000s. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 It must be stressed that some tests where repeated, even if not documented, showing equivalent results carried out 
with the last version of CATHARE2 at present available at UNIPI (Version 2.5_1). 
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From Fig. 19 to Fig. 21, it is reported the accuracy and the uncertainty distribution inside of the 
hypercubes normalized to the maximum value of the uncertainty and the accuracy respectively. 
These are: 124.20% and 67.69% for the primary pressure, 74.05% and 37.88% for the primary 
system mass inventory and finally 139.75% and 37.30% for the fuel cladding temperature. It 
should be noted that the general accuracy of the code prediction confirms the good quality of the 
post test analyses included in the database. The only high accuracy value (primary pressure) 
inside one hypercube, filled with only one test, is caused by the effect of data coming from this 
test during the stepwise injection of the hydro-accumulators (singularity occurring for a 
restricted range of time). From the uncertainty point of view, few hypercubes show a high 
uncertainty prediction. The check of such hypercubes demonstrates that all these are meaningless 
because not sufficiently filled. 
 
Once the database is available, defined and documented, and the CIAU procedure is developed, 
the QUM and TUV are ready for two different qualification processes (internal and external) as 
described in next sections. Nevertheless some considerations are hereafter summarized. 
 
• A small number of hypercubes and time intervals include meaningful data. The hypercubes 
filled are 225, but the condition for DAST application, three facility and ten data points in 
each hypercube, is fulfill in a smaller number of hypercubes. 
• A large number of hypercubes, or plant statuses, when combined with time intervals are 
not relevant or even not occurring in typical NPP scenarios. 
 
QUM TUV 
# Exp. ID CIAU ID Facility Type 
Description 
(Relevant information, SS 
significant condition, ECCS, AM 
procedures) 
N°  
Hyp. 
End 
EXP 
(s) 
End 
CALC 
(s) 
End 
CIAU 
data 
(s) 
1 CL-4-1-03 CT41 PSB-VVER SBLOCA 4.1% SBLOCA - CT of LOBI BL-34. 
 HA available, LPIS in loops 1, 3, 4  22 2593 3100 3100 
2 CL-0.5-03 T#08 PSB-VVER SBLOCA 
0.5% SBLOCA - HPIS & LPIS failure. 
AM: PS F&B by PORV opening and 
make-up system.  
27 3511 3511 3511 
3 CL-0.7-08 T#04 PSB-VVER SBLOCA 0.7% SBLOCA - AM: SS depress. by SG2 & 3  26 4377 4377 4377 
4 CL-0.7-12 T#11 PSB-VVER SBLOCA 
0.7% SBLOCA - HPIS failure. 
AM: SS cooldown 30 K/h & 1 HPIS 
recovery. 
23 4780 4570 4570 
5 CL-0.7-11 T#12 PSB-VVER SBLOCA 
0.7% SBLOCA - HPIS & LPIS failure. 
AM: SS cooldown 30 K/h& make-up 
system. 
23 10014 10014 10014 
6 LFW-25 T#01 PSB-VVER LOFW 
LOFW - LOFW. AM: SS depress. by SG1 
& 4 BRU-A opening, water from external 
source.  
12 21769 20250 20250 
7 LFW-28 T#02 PSB-VVER LOFW 
LOFW - AM: SS depress. by SG1 & 4 
BRU-A opening), water from ext. source 
and PS depress. by PORV. 
20 23240 23500 23500 
8 LFW-27 T#06 PSB-VVER LOFW LOFW - AM: PS F&B by PORV opening. 20 17273 17500 17500 
9 BO-05 T#07 PSB-VVER LOFW 
SBO - AM: SS depress. by SG1 & 4 
BRU-A opening, water from external 
source 
9 15016 15480 15480 
10 SL-100-01 T#05 PSB-VVER MSLB 
MSLB + PRISE - HPIS failure. AM: PS 
depress. by PORV opening & SS 
cooldown 60 K/h. 
20 8024 8215 8215 
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QUM TUV 
# Exp. ID CIAU ID Facility Type 
Description 
(Relevant information, SS 
significant condition, ECCS, AM 
procedures) 
N°  
Hyp. 
End 
EXP 
(s) 
End 
CALC 
(s) 
End 
CIAU 
data 
(s) 
11 PSh-1.4-05 T#09 PSB-VVER SGTR PRISE - BRU-A stuck open. AM: SS 
cooldown 60 K/h. 16 5700 5700 5700 
12 NC-6 T#10 PSB-VVER NC NC - Dreinage and refilling phases 10 39665 40461 40461 
13 PrzVS-01 T#03 PSB-VVER PORV PORV stuck open - Similar to Zaporozhye Acc. 12 3005 3000 3000 
14 11up 11up PSB-VVER IBLOCA 11% IBLOCA - Shakedown test 21 1035 1035 1035 
15 PSh-1.4-04 PSH1 PSB-VVER SGTR PRISE - BRU-A stuck open.  22 12425 12850 12850 
16 BL-44 BL44 LOBI SBLOCA 6% SBLOCA - Counterpart test- Full power. 19 2350 2500 2500 
17 BT-12 BT12 LOBI MSLB 100% MSLB - Hot Standby Condition. 5 650 680 680 
18 E2.2 EE22 PKL III SBLOCA SBLOCA - HPIS and LPIS (loop1 and 2) 18 16719 16719 16719 
19 F1.1 EF11 PKL III SBLOCA SBLOCA - HPIS in all loops 16 21500 21500 21500 
20 F1.2 EF12 PKL III NC NC - Drainage and refill phases 7 81770 79980 79980 
21-a 9.1b U91B BETHSY SBLOCA SBLOCA - ISP 27. HPIS failure. AM: Full 
opening of SG dump valve – by UNIPI 24 7000 8300 8300 
21-b 9.1b C91B BETHSY SBLOCA SBLOCA - ISP 27. HPIS failure. AM: Full 
opening of SG dump valve – by CEA 25 8000 8300 8300 
22-a 4.2b U42B BETHSY SBLOCA 
SBLOCA – Bottom vessel break. AM: 
Full opening of SG discharge valve – by 
UNIPI 
22 7060 7250 7250 
22-b 4.2b C42B BETHSY SBLOCA 
SBLOCA – Bottom vessel break. AM: 
Full opening of SG discharge valve – by 
CEA 
22 7060 6800 6800 
23 L2-5 L2-5 LOFT LBLOCA 200%LBLOCA – by CEA 13 130 120 115 
Tab. 12.   Transients utilized for filling the QUV and TUV. 
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Fig. 16.   TUV SET1_C2_2007M00 - distribution of tests function of physical time. 
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Fig. 17.   TUV SET1_C2_2007M00 - distribution of accuracy and uncertainty inside the time 
intervals and correspondence with the physical time. 
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Fig. 18.   QUM SET1_C2_2007M00 - distribution of tests inside the hypercubes. 
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Fig. 20.   QUM SET1_C2_2007M00 - distribution of tests inside the hypercubes. 
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Fig. 19.   QUM SET1_C2_2007M00 - uncertainty and accuracy distribution inside the 
hypercubes normalized to the maximum value: primary pressure. 
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Fig. 20.   QUM SET1_C2_2007M00 - uncertainty and accuracy distribution inside the 
hypercubes normalized to the maximum value: primary mass inventory. 
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Fig. 21.   QUM SET1_C2_2007M00 - uncertainty and accuracy distribution inside the 
hypercubes normalized to the maximum value: fuel clad temperature. 
5.1 The qualification 
One important issue of any tool, developed for safety analysis and in particular with regards of 
BE analyses performed with TH-SYS codes, is the possibility to perform an assessment and 
eventually to show the quality level. Two qualification steps (see Ref. /82/ and /83/) are foreseen 
in the case of CIAU: the internal qualification process, in section 5.1.1, and the independent or 
external qualification process, in section 5.1.2. 
5.1.1 Internal qualification 
The process /83/, continuously ongoing for RELAP5’s CIAU, has been performed for the first 
time in the framework of this activity with regards to CIAU developed for CATHARE2 code. It 
is devoted to the observation if the contents of the hypercubes. Data from the analysis of several 
SBLOCA could produce uncertainty values higher than data from the analysis of a similar 
number of LBLOCA, when the same hypercubes are concerned. In such case the number of 
hypercubes, i.e. the range of variation of the driving quantities, must be changed or the transient 
type must be identified inside each hypercube. 
 
More in detail, it must be shown that accuracy and uncertainty values in each hypercube or each 
time interval do not depend upon: 
 
1. time (into the transient) when the hypercube is reached; 
2. volume scaling factors; 
3. transient type (e.g. SBLOCA, LBLOCA, LOFW, etc.); 
4. dimension of hypercubes; 
5. ITF or SETF or NPP. 
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It must been stressed that the hypercubes are not sufficiently filled for having a representative 
distribution of tests, ITF, and type of transients. Notwithstanding this state, a simplified example 
of how the qualification process is led is given in Fig. 22 and Fig. 23. 
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Fig. 22.   Internal qualification of SET1_C2_2007M00: distribution of the primary pressure 
accuracies inside the hypercube “8 3 2 3 5 3”. 
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Fig. 23.   Internal qualification of SET1_C2_2007M00: distribution of the cladding 
temperature accuracies inside the hypercube “2 2 1 2 3 3”. 
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For sake of simplicity, the analysis has been carried out only on two hypercubes and two objects. 
The hypercubes selected are those that contain the higher number of tests (7). The objective can 
be partially fulfilled because looking at the figures below it is evident that the statistic is 
incomplete. Anyway, Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 let us imagine that the independence by the Kv of the 
facility and from the transient is met.  
 
As a conclusion the database gathered so far does not show any evident dependence. 
5.1.2 External qualification 
The second qualification step is carried out when a reasonable number of hypercubes and time 
intervals is filled. In this case CIAU is run to simulate qualified transients measured in ITFs that 
has not been utilized for getting uncertainty values. The objective is to demonstrate that CIAU 
(UBEP) calculated uncertainty bands envelop the experimental data together with the condition 
that uncertainty bands are “reasonably” large. The increase in the number of positively 
completed qualification analyses will increase the confidence level of the procedure. 
 
In this case, the SBLOCA experiment performed in the Japanese ITF LSTF is selected as 
objective of the analysis. The selection is based upon the following considerations. 
 
• This test has been selected as objective of the analysis for an international research activity 
organized by the OECD: the UMS described in Ref. /20/. 
• This test has been used for the application of UMAE method in the frame of the UMS /20/ 
with RELAP5 and CATHARE2 (see Refs. /28/ and /27/). 
• This test has been used for the independent (external) qualification of the CIAU 
development for RELAP5 code (see Refs. /82/, /83/ and /13/). 
 
The imposed sequence of main events is given in Tab. 13. TH-SYS code calculation was not 
performed in the framework of this activity. The simulation of the transient (not reported here in 
detail) and the time evolutions of the six quantities necessary for running the CIAU procedure 
and deriving the uncertainty bands were taken from the activity performed by M. Ingegneri in 
the framework of his Ph.D. thesis /27/9. Moreover the version of the code used was the V1.3u. 
The experimental data are used to show if the code calculation is bounded and to qualify the 
uncertainty methodology. The results are given in Fig. 24, Fig. 25 and Fig. 26 where the 
CATHARE2 best estimate prediction, the experimental data and the upper and lower predicted 
uncertainty limits are depicted for each of the three “object” quantities. 
 
No. EVENT SET POINT 
1 Break opening Time – t=0 s 
2 Scram PPRZ < 12.97 MPa 
3 MSL isolation PPRZ < 12.97 MPa 
4 MFW isolation PPRZ < 12.97 Mpa 
5 Pump trip PPRZ < 12.97 MPa 
6 SG SRV operation PSG > 8.03 MPa 
7 Accumulator actuation PPRZ < 4.5 Mpa 
8 Test end Time – t=900 s 
Tab. 13.   LSTF SB-CL-18 test: imposed sequence of main events. 
The following remarks on the application of the method are pointed out hereafter. 
 
                                                 
9
 It must been stressed that the calculation was issued for the participation to the UMS. 
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• Not all hypercubes crossed by the calculation are filled. Several hypercubes are not filled 
because the secondary side pressure of the LSTF facility is above 7MPa (the threshold 
value for switching from one hypercube to another), while almost all the tests (i.e. in 
PKL-III, PSB-VVER, LOBI) have nominal secondary side pressure below this value. For 
this reason the method of the neighboring hypercubes has been applied filling the empty 
hypercubes with the neighbors having lower secondary side pressure or lower/higher core 
power. In Tab. 14 all hypercubes crossed by the calculation and used for the uncertainty 
evaluation in the CIAU application are reported. Tab. 15 shows the contents of QAM 
with details on the test involved and their accuracy. 
• As already mentioned the calculation used is performed in the framework of another 
activity and described in Ref. /27/. Any detailed analysis of the input deck (not available) 
was not possible as well as a review of the results. Nevertheless these results were used 
for this verification because already published in the framework of the UMS. 
 
Time  # From  To Hypercube Used hypercube Comment  
0 -- 0 9 4 3 3 5 2 9 4 2 3 5 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower 
secondary side pressure 
1 0 1 9 4 3 3 5 2 9 4 2 3 5 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower 
secondary side pressure 
2 1 28 8 3 3 3 5 2 8 3 3 3 5 2  
3 28 36 7 3 3 3 5 2 7 3 3 3 4 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower core 
power 
4 36 44 7 2 3 3 5 2 7 2 3 3 4 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower core 
power 
5 44 62 7 2 3 3 4 2 7 2 3 3 4 2  
6 62 134 6 2 3 3 4 2 6 2 3 3 4 2  
7 134 152 6 2 3 3 3 2 6 2 3 3 4 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at higher core 
power 
8 152 160 6 1 3 3 3 2 6 1 3 3 3 2  
9 160 264 6 1 3 2 3 2 6 1 3 2 3 2  
10 264 404 5 1 3 2 3 2 5 1 3 2 3 2  
11 404 420 4 1 3 2 3 2 4 1 2 2 3 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower 
secondary side pressure 
12 420 458 4 1 3 3 3 2 4 1 2 3 2 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower 
secondary side pressure 
and lower core power 
13 458 484 3 1 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 3 2 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower 
secondary side pressure 
14 484 632 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower 
secondary side pressure 
15 632 710 2 1 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 
Substituted with the 
neighbor at lower 
secondary side pressure 
Tab. 14.   LSTF SB-CL-18 test: hypercubes interested by the transient and used in the CIAU 
application as function of the physical time. 
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9 4 2 3 5 2 
sl100-01   0.126 0.167  0.111  0.191 1.132 1.216 
psh14-05   0.497 1.907 -1.00  -1.00  0.955 2.909 
5 1 3 2 3 2 
cl-41-03   1.673 2.011 3.013 3.307 0.388 0.433 
8 3 3 3 5 3 
upi-4-2b   0.678 1.363 0.867 0.996 1.665 2.135 
cea-4-2b   3.618 4.602 1.996 2.250 0.736 0.900 
4 1 2 2 3 2 
cl-41-03   3.275  5.683 17.933 28.054 0.186 0.672 
cl-05-03   3.772  8.327  2.288  5.498 0.429 1.028 
cl-07-08  15.069 21.232  6.291 10.410 1.623 2.233 
CL-07-12   8.046 11.768  4.610  8.991 1.058 1.447 
CL-07-11   7.357 11.184  4.925  8.521 0.963 1.358 
7 3 3 3 4 2 
cl-41-03   9.585 12.880 10.211 11.175 0.434 0.933 
4 1 2 3 2 2 
bl----44   0.495 0.936 0.279 0.510 1.902 1.914 
7 2 3 3 4 2 
11-UP-br   0.853 1.153 8.001 8.859 1.761 2.031 
3 1 2 3 3 2 
cl-07-08 19.995 45.001 14.457 24.679 10.674 13.886 
CL-07-12  2.564  3.921 11.466 11.736  1.728  3.326 
CL-07-11  4.092  9.434 10.600 13.675  7.003 14.011 
6 2 3 3 4 2 
cl-41-03   1.450 1.450 10.794 11.644 2.937 5.897 
11-UP-br   1.856 2.655  4.588  8.042 1.280 1.413 
3 1 2 2 3 3 
cl-07-08  22.213 27.893  3.771  7.569 3.657 8.174 
CL-07-11  14.343 26.349 14.619 25.342 1.913 3.192 
upi-4-2b   1.733  3.657 10.978 15.661 0.640 3.835 
cea-4-2b   7.195 10.733  4.644 10.753 1.047 2.095 
6 1 3 3 3 2 
cl-41-03   2.948 6.382 5.132 9.664 0.523 1.970 
2 1 2 2 3 3 
CL-07-11 17.261 18.478 19.273 23.508 2.122 2.189 
6 1 3 2 3 2 
cl-41-03   1.942  3.666 4.959 7.447 0.365 0.632 
cl-05-03   9.872 10.969 4.808 5.896 1.038 1.197 
 
Tab. 15.   LSTF SB-CL-18 test: data inside QAM of the hypercubes used. 
The application brings to the conclusions summarized hereafter. 
 
• The uncertainty bands have been obtained for a calculated test not included in the CIAU 
database as requested by definition of Independent/External Qualification Process. 
• The uncertainty bounds the experiments.  
• The comparison between the uncertainty limits calculated using the RELAP5 /13/ and 
CATHARE2 CIAU database highlights that the first gives in general narrower bands as 
consequence of the decreasing of the values Es and Eσ with the increasing of the number 
of points and tests inside the hypercubes. 
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Fig. 24.   LSTF SB-CL-18 test: uncertainty bands for primary pressure. 
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Fig. 25.   LSTF SB-CL-18 test: uncertainty bands for primary mass inventory. 
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Fig. 26.   LSTF SB-CL-18 test: uncertainty bands for cladding temperature. 
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5.2 Application 
The first pioneering application, of the “SET1_C2_2007M00” database, with relevance to the 
nuclear industry is presented in this section. This has been performed outside of any agreement 
and the results are only devoted to test the performance of the CIAU methodology developed for 
CATHARE2 code. This application does not have any objective to evaluate the performance 
of the NPP in any sense as well as to provide results that could be used for safety analysis. 
 
The transient selected is a 200mm break in Kozloduy-3 NPP (see Ref /84/). This transient has 
been selected because the same analysis was performed by UNIPI with RELAP5 in the 
framework of an independent safety evaluation of the transient behaviour of the Kozloduy-3 
VVER 440/230 NPP (675 MWth) following Large Break LOCA event. The considered LOCA is 
originated by a 200 mm single ended break in cold leg, and conservative boundary and initial 
conditions were assumed. A comprehensive analysis of the “LBLOCA 200 mm” transient is in 
Ref /84/. The specific purposes of this analysis included, as stated in Ref. /84/: 
 
• the demonstration that the use of the CATHARE2 code provides quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar predictions as the RELAP5; 
• the execution of an independent safety analysis supported by uncertainty evaluation with 
RELAP5 (use of the method available at UNIPI). 
 
The following comments regarding the activity are also reported in Ref. /13/: 
 
• The application of the uncertainty method to the results of the “LBLOCA 200 mm” might 
be not justified owing to the use of some conservative input data. However the UNIPI 
uncertainty evaluation to the analysis by RELAP5 code allows the quantitative evaluation 
of the results and they are supported by a further application of CATHARE2 code.  
• Uncertainty results related to the rod surface temperature that are obtained from the 
application of CIAU, having as reference the UNIPI-RELAP5 calculation, are 
summarized in Fig. 27. 
• The “PCT licensing” predicted by CIAU (1062 °C) lies within the licensing acceptability 
threshold (1200 °C). The available safety margin is close to 150 K. The uncertainty 
results obtained by CIAU are supported by the outcome of the sensitivity study. The 
removal of the conservatism considered in the process, which could not be justified 
within the present context, is expected to bring the predicted ‘PCT licensing’ below 
1000°C. 
• The demonstration that the results of predictions by RELAP5 and CATHARE2 are not in 
contradiction has been obtained through the uncertainty bands calculated by CIAU having 
as reference the RELAP5 calculation. Fig. 27 shows that the CATHARE2 results are 
embedded within the uncertainty bands of the RELAP5, when the same transient is 
calculated with the same boundary and initial conditions, thus allowing a successful 
solution to the assigned problem. 
 
Starting from these considerations the CIAU procedure developed for CATHARE2 code 
(SET1_C2_2007M00, see Tab. 12) has been applied to the CATHARE2 results. The reference 
CATHARE2 code calculation labeled “WGvven06” the six driving quantities have been used for 
carrying out the uncertainty bands. The list of the hypercubes crossed by the transient is listed in 
Tab. 16. Three hypercubes of sixteen are empty (the first is not relevant) and the some others are 
not sufficiently filled with different tests executed in different ITF (as well as SETF or NPP). 
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Nevertheless the CIAU procedure has been applied without any substitution of hypecubes 
(neighbor hypecubes technique). The main results are summarized in Fig. 28, Fig. 29 and Fig. 30 
where the primary pressure, the primary side mass inventory and the cladding temperature are 
showed. In these figures the three parameters trends calculated are reported together with the 
upper and lower bounds. The blue line is the results carried out with CATHARE2 for the 
reference calculation. In two time ranges (between 77-140s and 180-190s) the uncertainty bands 
join the calculated value because the hypercubes are empty. 
 
The following comments are pointed out in order to summarize the results: 
 
• CIAU procedure developed for CATHARE2 cannot be applied directly to this transient in 
order to perform accident analysis calculation (for such purpose should be applied the 
“neighbors” hypercubes technique); 
• nevertheless, the Fig. 28, Fig. 29 and Fig. 30 demonstrate again that the results of 
predictions by RELAP5 and CATHARE2 are not in contradiction. 
 
Time  
# 
From  To 
Time Block Coordinates hypercube No. files No. points Comments 
0 -1 0 1 8 4 2 3 5 2 0 0 Empty not used 
1 0 1 2 8 3 2 3 4 2 3 37  
2 1 3 4 7 3 2 3 4 2 2 5  
3 3 6 7 6 3 2 3 3 2 1 5  
4 6 11 12 6 3 2 2 3 2 5 97  
5 11 23 24 5 3 2 2 3 2 0 0  
6 23 32 33 5 2 2 2 3 2 2 93  
7 32 77 78 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 87  
8 77 140 121 4 2 2 2 2 2 0 0  
9 140 150 126 4 1 2 2 2 2 1 40  
10 150 180 141 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 5  
11 180 190 146 4 1 2 4 2 2 0 0  
12 190 288 195 3 1 2 4 2 2 1 52  
13 288 468 285 2 1 2 4 2 2 1 50  
14 468 484 293 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 15  
15 484 486 294 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 120  
16 486 900 501 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 238  
Tab. 16.   CIAU application to Kozloduy unit 3 ‘LBLOCA 200 mm’, reference CATHARE2 
prediction (SET1_C2_2007M00): hypercubes interested by the transient and used in the CIAU 
application as function of the physical time. 
University of Pisa - DIMNP - 89 - Section 5 
 Ph. D. Thesis in Nuclear Safety - XIX Cycle 
Alessandro Del Nevo - January 2007 - Page 89 of 258 
 
Fig. 27.   Uncertainty analysis of the ‘200 mm’ LOCA-DBA of VVER-440 NPP: main result 
from CIAU RELAP5 (Set No. 1) application. 
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Fig. 28.   CIAU application to Kozloduy unit 3 ‘LBLOCA 200 mm’, reference CATHARE2 
prediction (SET1_C2_2007M00): uncertainty bands for UP pressure. 
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Fig. 29.   CIAU application to Kozloduy unit 3 ‘LBLOCA 200 mm’, reference CATHARE2 
prediction (SET1_C2_2007M00): uncertainty bands for primary side mass inventory. 
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Fig. 30.   CIAU application to Kozloduy unit 3 ‘LBLOCA 200 mm’, reference CATHARE2 
prediction (SET1_C2_2007M00): uncertainty bands for maximum cladding temperature. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
UNIPI has a long tradition in the development and validation of BE thermal hydraulic system 
codes (i.e. RELAP5), as well as in executing relevant experimental campaign in experimental 
facility (i.e. PIPER-One). Moreover it was strongly active also in developing methodologies for 
evaluating the uncertainty connected with the BE analysis. Several activities were devoted to the 
development, assessment, qualification and application of the uncertainty methods. 
 
At present, Code with the capability of Internal Assessment of Uncertainty (CIAU) is the last 
tool developed at UNIPI for estimate the error of the TH-SYS codes in predicting the NPP 
transient scenarios. It is based on two self-standing tools: a thermal hydraulic system code and an 
uncertainty methodology. 
 
The research activity was proposed and assigned in this framework, aimed at the investigation of 
the issues related to the uncertainty evaluation in the Best Estimate analyses, with particular 
regard to the extension and the strengtheness of the CIAU procedure capability. 
 
In particular the main objective is the development of a “tool” capable to predict the 
unavoidable uncertainty associated to TH-SYS codes analyses, with reference to CATHARE2, 
based upon the CIAU procedure. This requires the creation of a “database of errors” specific for 
the French code that constitutes the “kernel” for the CIAU procedure applicability. A database of 
at least 20 tests was judged a reasonable target, during the first presentation of the Ph.D. program 
(March 2004). 
 
In order to fulfill the objective, several activities have been performed connected with three 
relevant international activities: OECD PSB-VVER, OECD PKL III and TACIS 2.03/97 
Projects. 
 
The first part of the activity was devoted to collect and analyze the tests already available at 
UNIPI. Between the tests reviewed, seven (executed in LOBI/Mod2, BETHSY and LOFT) were 
judged qualitatively enough documented to be included in the database. 
 
The part of the Ph.D. activity that required the largest amount of resources, in terms of 
manpower, professional skill and computational tools, was the application of thermal-hydraulic 
codes (CATHARE2 and also RELAP5) necessary for preparing the database. This activity 
required the preparation, the qualification and the application of suitable input decks following 
the procedures envisaged in the UMAE method. The use of the TH-SYS codes was also aimed 
at: 
 
• designing the experiments executed in PSB-VVER ITF (TACIS 2.03/97 Projects); 
• assessing the codes capabilities to simulate transients in Easter NPP layout and transient 
involving boron transport phenomena; 
• qualifying computational tools used for performing safety analyses focused on the 
development of AM procedures; 
• comparing the performances of different TH-SYS codes used for Best Estimate analyses 
(i.e. CATHARE2, RELAP5/Mod3.3, RELAP5-3D©, ATHLET, KORSAR, etc…); 
• verifying the qualification method developed at UNIPI in the framework of UMAE and 
assessing the tool used for the quantitative accuracy evaluation (FFT-BM); 
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• contributing in providing relevant post tests results usable for the development of the 
CIAU procedure for RELAP5 code. 
 
A database of tests satisfactory for the development of CIAU procedure was carried out by the 
extensive use of the code CATHARE2 in the framework of the post test analyses. Moreover, the 
application of the RELAP5 code allowed to adequately support the assessment of the French 
code. 
 
A procedure for archiving, classifying and verifying the test of the database based on figure and 
table has been set up in order to allow an easy check of all database tests and of their 
implementation in the CIAU procedure. This procedure records in systematic way all relevant 
information characterizing the database and its implementation (the relevant documents, the 
input decks, the experimental data, the identification of the used parameters, etc...). The scope is 
the possibility to easily transfer the “know how” gained in the development phase to any other 
developer (or user) and to allow a quick verification of all data embedded in QUM and TUV. 
 
Once the database was implemented, the qualification of the tool was fulfill, as already done for 
the RELAP5 database. The demonstration of the quality of the activity performed, and in 
particular of the database developed, is highlighted by the followings: 
 
• the complete documentation of the activity; 
• the procedure for documenting the database, as already discussed above; 
• the application of the internal qualification; 
• the application of the independent/external qualification: the same test case (the LSTF SB-
CL-18) used in the framework of UMS was selected. This choice is based on the 
followings considerations: 
o the independent/external qualification was carried out to the CIAU procedure 
developed for RELAP5 using the same test; 
o the UMAE methods for evaluating uncertainty (predecessor of CIAU) was applied to 
both RELAP5 and CATHARE2 codes in the framework of UMS; 
o a comparative analysis of the results was possible (but outside the scope of the present 
work). 
• The sample pioneering application to Kozloduy-3 NPP transient and comparison of the 
results obtained with RELAP5. The results did not show any substantial difference in the 
uncertainty predictions of the two codes (RELAP5 and CATHARE2) using CIAU 
procedure. Finally, this application is also relevant because shows the state of 
development of the CIAU procedure for CATHARE2 code, as well as confirms that the 
hypothesis at the basis of CIAU are valid if another TH-SYS code is used. 
 
In conclusion, during the activity, a reliable tool was developed, documented assess and qualify 
capable to be used in BEPU approach to accident analysis (DBA and BDBA) and accident 
management with CATHARE2 code. The applicability of the method to the licensing is also a 
relevant achievement and innovation of the Ph.D. activity. 
 
Finally, the demonstration of the applicability of the CIAU procedure to Catahre2 as well as 
RELAP5, confirms “a posteriori” the hypothesis that it can be developed for any other 
“qualified” BE TH-SYS code. 
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